CCTV shows Westgate attackers were in no hurry
Two of the terrorists are seen in this CCTV footage walking around in Nakumatt Supermaket. CFM.
NAIROBI, Kenya Oct 5 – Attackers of the Westgate Shopping Mall are seen walking fearlessly with no sense of panic after executing 67 people, in the worst terror attack to have occurred in the country since the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi.
Four attackers, wielding automatic rifles, with ammunition bags strapped on their backs were captured by CCTV cameras, as they walked up and down in the expansive mall while conversing and laughing about while gesturing at one another. One can be seen kicking a mini computer on a teller in the Nakumatt Supermaket.
Four attackers, wielding automatic rifles, with ammunition bags strapped on their backs were captured by CCTV cameras, as they walked up and down in the expansive mall while conversing and laughing about while gesturing at one another. One can be seen kicking a mini computer on a teller in the Nakumatt Supermaket.
Security forces have been able to profile the attackers Captured by the CCTV cameras, and identified them as notorious terror suspects who were on their wanted persons list.
One of them is Abu Baraal Al Sudani, a Somali extremist with links to Al Qaeda, who is known to be a sharp shooter.
In the CCTV, Al Sudani is clearly seen in a Khaki cream trouser, a dark blue or black jacket, white sports shoes and an ammunition bag around his waist.
Another attacker seen in the CCTV in Omar Nabhan who is thought to have been born and brought up in Mombasa before moving out to Somalia for training.
On the day of the attack, the man believed to be Nabhan who was also carrying a rifle was wore a sky blue shirt and what appears to be brown pair of trousers with a head scarf.
The third attacker identified by security forces so far is a man thought to be Khatab Al Khane who was initially based in Mogadishu.
He is described by police as an extremist who has substantial knowledge of using explosives and all types of rifles. The CCTV footage released to the media is carefully edited to extract unsuitable images, including the real action when the attackers were shooting and tossing grenades at shoppers in the mall.
Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo says they have since established that the number of attackers who took part in the October 21 siege were between four to six and not ten to fifteen as earlier reported by investigators.
“From what we have now that is coming out of the investigation, the number of attackers was between four to six,” police Chief David Kimaiyo told Kenyan television station KTN.
“None of them managed to escape from the building after the attack,” he said, implying that they were killed in the confrontation.
During the four-day siege authorities had said that between 10 and 15 gunmen were involved, and later claimed to have killed five of them. 67 civilians and six security forces were also killed in the confrontation with the attackers.
Witnesses in the mall described how the fighters stormed the complex midday on that Saturday when it was crowded with shoppers, firing from the hip and hurling grenades at shoppers and staff.
CCTV camera footage from one part of the mall showed only four young men ambling around with AK-47 rifles in hand.
Kimaiyo also confirmed that wanted British “White Widow” Samantha Lewthwaite — reported to have been one of the attackers — was not involved.
“On Samantha we have also established that she was not part of the attackers in the building. There was no woman.”
President Uhuru Kenyatta has announced plans to establish a commission of inquiry to probe the attack.
COMMENTS:
To me it seems strange they could walk around just like that.... The whole story is smelly. I don't thing we will ever hear the real story.
I did not write Kenyan Somalis, because I need to be clear that there are some people who exist on this planet were not Citizens of somalia before the dual nationality clause. There is another facet. They are Kenyans, and there are Somalis. You can go farther, but I do not say Kenyan Kikuyu, Kenyan Maasai, kenyan Bantu, Kenyan European... Etc. You know this because when you are a diplomat from Kenya or have seen/participated in the olympics, you carry the flag of ...Kenya as a Kenyan. To go deeper, means that that I need to balance everything in order to be considerate of every nuance, and I am not writing a thesis or a book.
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Saturday, October 5,
2013
Security chiefs intensify blame game as probe into attack starts
KDF soldiers entering Westgate mall on September 21, 2013 after terrorists attacked Westgate mall. Photo/JEFF ANGOTE
In Summary
- Sunday Nation has established that the rivalry escalated when KDF reduced internal security units to doing peripheral duties at Westgate
- Technically, the Constitution mandates Inspector-General David Kimaiyo to be in charge of the operation. However, when KDF took over, he was bypassed and all were reporting to the Department of Defence
By ANDREW
TEYIE
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Friday, October 4, 2013
By ROY GACHUHI
Rivalry within top security agencies has intensified ahead of the naming of a
commission of inquiry to investigate security lapses that may have resulted in
the Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack three weeks ago.
Top government sources on Saturday told the Sunday Nation that the inquiry is
expected to point out who failed Kenyans between the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF),
National Intelligence Service and the Kenya Police Service, since the three
agencies seem to trade blame for being negligent in their duties to protect
Kenyans.
The anxiety within the security agencies also comes ahead of investigations
into the matter by a joint parliamentary team, scheduled to start Monday.
The joint team is headed by Defence and Foreign Relations Committee chairman
Ndung’u Gethenji and his Administration and National Security counterpart Asman
Kamama. The MPs have promised to give a report within 30 days.
Sunday Nation has established that the rivalry escalated when KDF reduced
internal security units to doing peripheral duties at Westgate.
At one time, a KDF commander ordered some senior police officers, who were
not in uniform, to leave the scene. But one of the police bosses intervened and
they resisted the move.
The rivalry started on Saturday, September 21, when a commander of the GSU’s
Recce squad was killed by friendly fire.
KDF took over from Recce unit in a changeover that is thought to have allowed
the terrorists, who were on the retreat in the mall, to gain ground.
Technically, the Constitution mandates Inspector-General David Kimaiyo to be
in charge of the operation. However, when KDF took over, he was bypassed and all
were reporting to the Department of Defence — an issue that came out explicitly
during press conferences held between Interior Minister Joseph Lenku, Mr Kimaiyo
and KDF chief Julius Karangi.
A security Consultant with Executive Protection Services, Mr George Musamali,
yesterday said there was a breakdown of command structure at Westgate, which has
disgruntled respective security agencies.
Mr Musamali argued that the government needs to come up with a paper
detailing how KDF can work with the police in future operations to avoid
inter-agency rivalry.
“If we continue like this, we will have a crisis in the event that we have another attack. As it is now, no one wants to take responsibility for anything because the change of guard from Recce unit to KDF created a vacuum, which terrorists took advantage of,” he said.
“If we continue like this, we will have a crisis in the event that we have another attack. As it is now, no one wants to take responsibility for anything because the change of guard from Recce unit to KDF created a vacuum, which terrorists took advantage of,” he said.
He maintained that the Westgate attack was supposed to be handled by police
and not KDF.
“The Kenya Police Service has all kinds of officers. GSU, Recce unit,
Administration Police among others. This was purely a police matter and not for
KDF. That is where the rivalry starts and ends,” he said.
However, the inter-agency rivalry happens all over the world, according to
the consultant. He wondered why the joint Parliamentary investigation team wants
to release its report after 30 days.
“They know that Kenyans have short memories. The heat on who owns the failure
would have reduced,” he says.
On Saturday, Mr Kamama and Mr Gethenji declined to reveal the security chief
they are scheduled to grill on Monday.
CHARM OFFENSIVE
Following a week of bad publicity after their personnel were accused of
looting shops at Westgate, KDF on Friday began a charm offensive to win back
public trust.
The job was handed to Major Emmanuel Chirchir, one of the force’s spokesmen,
who took to Twitter to announce that they helped “repatriate” Sh300 million from
banks, forex bureaus and the casino at the mall.
Major Chirchir declared that KDF knows its enemies, who “have decided to use
propaganda to undermine our public goodwill”.
KDF has suggested that their internal security counterparts have been
responsible for the now widely held view that the soldiers were involved in the
looting of shops in the mall when they kicked everyone out.
Major Chirchir has argued that no shops were looted and demanded a list of
the shops involved and their owners.
“It would also be good to list shops that were vandalised out of the over 80
stores. So far, Bata shop has talked of its shop being intact. KDF did a
fantastic job, we know our enemies who have decided to use propaganda to
undermine our public good will”, he said.
The issue is complicated by the fact that police have declared that anyone
who looted shops at the Mall will be prosecuted.
They are keen on taking to court even the KDF personnel alleged to have been
seen on CCTV footage looting shops.
“Listen to me very well. We have opened a file for anyone who lost property
that was not destroyed by fire to record a statement. If we establish that the
shops were looted, we will look at the footage and charge those responsible for
this criminality,” said Nairobi Criminal Investigation Department commander
Nicholas Kamwende on phone.
If they are to go after KDF’s soldiers and officers, they will need the help
of the military police, who ensure law and order in the defence forces, to hand
over the suspected rogue personnel to the civilian justice system.
In the event of criminality, KDF initiates its internal system, which could
either be a disciplinary committee or a court martial before handing over any
rogue members to the civilian justice system.
According to the officers in the know, the battles over alleged looting at
Westgate are symptoms of a bigger turf war to win over the hearts and minds of
the Commander-in-Chief, President Uhuru Kenyatta.
Reported by ANDREW TEYIE and JOHN
NGIRACHU.
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Friday, October 4, 2013
The military lost the plot in Westgate siege, says retired general
Lieutenant-General (rtd) Humphrey Njoroge. For a career soldier who spent a great deal of his time in service, what happened on the unforgettable noonday of Saturday, September 21, when Al-Shabaab attackers stormed a shopping mall in Nairobi, was an unfortunate display of planning and execution lapses by security forces that almost turned tragi-comic.
In Summary
- The first hard question: What was the chain of command during all these change-overs? In a military operation, when you pin down an enemy, you do not break the fire-fight, says Lt-Gen Njoroge.
By ROY GACHUHI
Lieutenant-General (rtd) Humphrey Njoroge, once Commandant of Kenya’s National Defence College, is a worried man.
For a career soldier who spent a great deal of his time in service, what happened on the unforgettable noonday of Saturday, September 21, when Al-Shabaab attackers stormed a shopping mall in Nairobi, was an unfortunate display of planning and execution lapses by security forces that almost turned tragi-comic.
The terrorists’ objective was to seize Westgate Shopping Mall, and they did it, he says, by employing the age-old tactic of surprise.
Once this happened, a succession of lapses ensued. Those who arrived first were police on patrol, who thought they were dealing with an armed robbery.
When the magnitude of the problem dawned on them, reinforcements were brought in the form of the General Service Unit’s Recce Company, the para-military police’s most elite squad.
It is unclear how smooth the change-over from the patrol police to the GSU was, but even the Recce Company would not finish the job and was relieved by the Kenya Defence Forces.
The first hard question: What was the chain of command during all these change-overs? In a military operation, when you pin down an enemy, you do not break the fire-fight, says Lt-Gen Njoroge. You must continually reinforce it no matter what else you do until you completely subdue the enemy. If you break it, you give your enemy a chance to recover.
“This kind of thing requires a rehearsal,” he says. “It won’t happen as if by accident. Training in peace-time is done so that in war you react automatically. There is no time or space to argue about ‘how do we pull out’ or whatever. If this doesn’t happen, that is not a military operation as far as I am concerned.”
But the biggest lapse of the operation, for which the country could yet pay another bloody price in future, was the handling of people coming out of the building. Even Kenyans not schooled in security matters were aghast at testimonies of terrified survivors, lamenting how they pointed out attackers who had changed clothes to police and were now mingling with them — only for the officers to order them: “Get out! Get out!”
It sounded incredible, but that is actually what happened, which begs the question: Did some of the security personnel know exactly what they were doing there?
The real possibility of catching a terrorist alive should have made them drop everything else. The horrific reality is that we now have terrorists among us, probably planning another atrocity.
“The military in peace-time is always training,” says Lt-Gen Njoroge. “We simulate a multiplicity of scenarios... I will be surprised if they did not train in a basement area, on a building with three storeys or more where there are civilians. And, of course, if they did, they certainly should have known how to handle people coming out of the building.
“Quite simply, those people should not have been allowed to go home just like that. In any military operation where you have prisoners, there are procedures to release them. You take them to a safe area, you separate officers and civilians, and then you do a thorough, unhurried screening.
“Quite obviously, the biggest failure at Westgate was not securing all people emerging from the building, including those who were taken to hospitals. They all had a story of interest to security personnel. Everybody at Westgate — if not all of Nairobi — should have been regarded as a suspect. All exits and entrances to the city, all airports and border points should have been sealed for as long it was needed to screen people.”
A recent example of this kind of ruthless police efficiency was the aftermath of the bombing that took place at the end of the Boston City Marathon in the US. Immediately after the explosions, the entire city was put on a virtual lockdown, and police arrested suspects who were far from the scene of crime.
“To do this kind of thing,” says the retired officer, “you must have drills during peace-time. Regrettably, some people committed mass murder here and then ran away with the survivors, past security personnel.”
He points out that the National Security Intelligence Service as presently constituted legally does not have arresting powers.
Unlike other intelligence services, such as Israel’s Mossad, Russia’s KGB or America’s CIA, which are mandated to act on the intelligence they gather, Kenya’s spying body can only pass on that information to another authority. Whether that authority chooses to act on it or not is beyond the NSIS.
As far as he is concerned, this is an anomaly that must be corrected as soon as possible, for it is fodder for a frustrating blame game. The NSIS, therefore, should have arresting powers.
This, though, would require a great shift in the psyche of Kenyans, more so those old enough to remember the Kanu era.
The NSIS, in those days called the Special Branch, was the most notorious security arm of the government in making dissidents disappear — to their graves or to exile. Mindful of that, framers of Kenya’s current Constitution went out of their way to make the NSIS as unthreatening as they possibly could.
But, in light of Westgate, it may become necessary to make a U-turn.
Lt-Gen Njoroge, an alumnus of Army War College in the US, among, other institutions, was a long-standing military theorist and trainer in the KDF. His career stretched from 1969 to 2004, most of it as a trainer, save for a few command postings.
He taught weapons and tactics to lower-cadre soldiers, operational art to middle-level officers and strategy and policy to colonels and generals. In 1981, he penned a detailed paper on urban warfare while at the Defence Staff College, and reading it today must make any Westgate witness wince.
In the paper, he strongly advocated joint training of the Army and the Police since in situations such as Westgate, they would be required to work together. It still does not happen, and this is thought to have resulted in a friendly fire incident during the siege.
“At the moment,” he wrote in 1981, “there is no joint training that is carried out between the GSU and the Army in dealing with urban violence, and since we shall come to aid them in case of failure, we must train together for the sake of command and control. This will make us know their capabilities and limitations. The Joint Headquarters would also practise the aspect of command control, and I feel this aspect is very necessary.
“The Army must also be trained to be able to live and fight under urban conditions to avoid undue harassment of children, women and the aged and the looting, which comes about when an inexperienced Army is exposed to these things.”
The paper delves into the concept of Fighting in Built up Areas — known as FIBUA in military jargon — and describes the scenarios as the most complex and most challenging any soldier could face.
Every room and every corner, every corridor and stairway, is a front. These fronts keep changing because your enemy keeps moving; one moment the front is in front of you, the next moment it is behind. The streets outside are fronts as well. All this requires intelligence gathering, training and equipment altogether different from standard military training, where the front is manned by another army.
Illusions are the truths
Writing two years after September 11, Nancy Gibbs, the noted TIME Magazine journalist, said: “Illusions are the truths we live by until we know better.
Americans certainly know what it feels like to watch them explode: this week, two years ago, the US lost for good the sunny sense that the world is safe, that the oceans protect it, that there are rules even among the hateful against mass slaughter of the innocent.”
Westgate, on September 21, is Kenya’s version of the destruction of America’s symbols of economic might and military power.
And our illusions that those bleeping metal detectors and mirrors under our cars operated by receptionists in uniform offer us security must be replaced by a new truth — that they are deterrents to just the most amateur of thugs amongst us.
Given the current status of our security, a determined terrorist will simply laugh them off and proceed to unleash mayhem on innocents.
Lt-Gen Njoroge is certain that the terrorists who authored the carnage at Westgate had been stationed in the building for quite a while, and that the ones who were seen coming in were just the triggers. It is impossible, he says, to hold the fire of the police, the GSU and the Army for four days with the handful of weapons that they were seen getting into the building with.
You needed a truck to carry that amount of weaponry, he says, and high grade explosives are carried in parts and then assembled on site. Somewhere inside the mall was the assembly point.
This took days or even months of planning and work. That it all went undetected represents a great indictment on the country’s security authorities.
As a result, Lt-Gen Njoroge worries deeply about two things regarding terrorism in Kenya. One is corruption, the other idle and highly trained former soldiers and policemen.
Corruption is at the heart of every Kenyan failure, and in this case it may emerge that the source was at the Immigration Department.
To resolve these, he urges rearmament of Kenya’s moral fabric, and re-engagement of retired military and police officers.
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