Sunday, January 12, 2014

The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?

The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?

Good People,

Compare notes that of Acheson-Brown with that of Brandon R. Newhart about the Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the difference between Invasion of State Sovereignty with that of Preservation of Human
Rights differs.........and considering also instances of pre-emptiveness of that
of playing a DECOY to achieve ultra mission and purposes.
On another observation, I am glad that, the United Nations Security Council comes to play where IGAD has failed and have shown conflict of interest and
where Museveni took advance for his greed and special interest; and why Riek
Machar's team at the cease fire meeting in Ethiopia has right to demand that Museveni remove his Uganda Army from South Sudan in Juba.
Judy Miriga
Diaspora Spokesperson
Executive Director
Confederation Council Foundation for Africa Inc.,
Is R2P a Western concept? What consequence does this have on its affect and implementation?
Posted on March 15, 2013 by incognitowl
Authored by Acheson-Brown
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was first established in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, and was formally adopted by the United Nations in 2005. The idea contains a set of principles that essentially deem international humanitarian intervention to be a ‘responsibility’ in extreme situations involving genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Since its conception, there have been various criticisms of the principle; many having accused the idea of being solely a Western concept, used to justify beneficial international endeavors. This paper seeks to argue that the modern-day definition of R2P essentially is a Western concept, yet despite this, the principle of humanitarian intervention that lies behind it has basis in other societies. Recent R2P interventions in Libya will be considered, as well as humanitarian intervention that has occurred in non-Western states before R2P became an international norm. The paper will also discuss the idea that the West is using R2P as an excuse for a form of ‘new-age imperialism’ in order to pursue their own interests internationally, using case studies such as Darfur and the Iraq War to argue that this does appear to have been the case at times. Having also considered the affect this may have on non-Western countries’ perceptions of R2P, the paper will conclude that Responsibility to Protect is a Western concept, and this affects the way in which it is implemented. However even if R2P has appeared to be misused by the West in some instances, the concept is one that should not be avoided in a globalized society, where tragedies such as the Rwandan genocide can and should be prevented.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was first recognized in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICSS) in 2001, and was officially espoused at the United Nations World Summit in 2005. The theory contains a set of rules that state that humanitarian intervention is a ‘responsibility’ in extreme situations involving genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.[1] There has been widespread critique of the principle since its birth – many have labeled the doctrine a Western concept with a neo-imperialist agenda. Yet is this truly the case? This paper will seek to argue that although there is some truth in this claim, it can also not be denied that Responsibility to Protect has its basis in other societies and cultures. Furthermore, this has led to critics, and non-Western countries, labeling the concept as a form of “new-age imperialism;” a claim which will be discussed in more detail throughout this piece. Thus, it will be argued that the ideas that lie behind R2P may not be Western, yet the way in which the new concept has been executed is very much of a Western nature.
In order to effectively evaluate whether Responsibility to Protect is a Western concept, it is first necessary to define what is meant by a number of terms. For the purposes of this paper, although far too complex to be narrowed down into one definition, “western” will be taken to mean those countries whose social and political cultures are derived from Western Europe; more specifically, Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Responsibility to Protect is harder to define. On its face, the definition that was adopted at the United Nations World Summit in 2005 is the one that will be utilized. In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document, it is expressed that:
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means…to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[2]
However, to truly understand this concept, and in turn, to determine if it is solely a Western one, one needs to consider the origins and theories that lie behind this ideal; primarily international ethics and humanitarian intervention, which stemmed from the former. The concept of both humanitarian intervention and thus R2P began in the fifth century, when St. Augustine advocated the ‘Just War’ theory; in short, that in certain circumstances of human rights violations, a sovereign was entitled to launch a just or fair war.[3] This doctrine was expanded upon by both Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius in the late 1200s and 1625 respectively, and then by modern-day theorists looking at international structures and norms. Although Responsibility to Protect, and its predecessor humanitarian intervention, may occasionally be at odds with international law, it is very familiar to Liberal international ethics, and even to Realist and Constructivist theory, as Michael Doyle argues.[4] Liberal theorists, such as Bentham and Kant, argue that in international politics, focus on the state is in itself insufficient; although nationalism in the form of self-determination is important this needs to be squared with universal human rights and national security.[5] In relation to humanitarian intervention and thus R2P, Liberalists generally promote intervention exclusively as a “last resort.” They also stipulate that interveners require a morally defensible motive, and that they must have the purpose of ending the human rights violation in question and seek to establish an autonomous people.[6] Surprisingly, Realist theory offers a not entirely different view on international intervention. From as early as 411BC, Realist scholars such as Thucydides, and subsequently, Carr and Morgenthau, have argued that international politics revolves around nation state’s seeking power, prestige and profit to benefit themselves; essentially, due to the anarchy of the international system, there is a constant threat to security for all nations, and as a result, foreign policy revolves around combating this threat.[7] Thus, Realists argue that intervention is plausible when it is in the state’s interest to intervene, and is not plausible when it is not in their interests. Finally, Constructivist arguments also advocate humanitarian intervention in some circumstances. These theorists, like Alexander Wendt, believe that states, through their dialogues and customs, help to produce an international structure. Yet at the same time, this international structure impacts upon the identity and customs of the states.[8] As a result, unlike Realists and Liberalists, Constructivists do not view sovereignty and humanitarian intervention as two opposing principles; they believe that sovereignty is socially constructed, and thus is malleable to outside influence and changes in social context. Thus, these scholars argue that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, instead of an inalienable right. If they fail in this responsibility, then the sovereign is no longer definite, and humanitarian intervention is a necessary and viable consequence.[9] Each of these theories need to be noted, as it is evident that the theory behind R2P came into play well before today’s “Western” mentality came into being, and is supported by many schools of thought, demonstrating that the theory behind Responsibility to Protect is not wholly Western.
However, aside from a simply analytical viewpoint, humanitarian intervention has been seen in practice numerous times throughout history, in particular throughout the last few decades. This paper will define humanitarian intervention as meaning “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”[10] This idea that international intervention in a sovereign’s affairs is valid when certain human rights violations takes place is most certainly not confined to Western nations. Although state sovereignty as an exclusive right has been advocated since the 1600s and the Treaty of Westphalia, this idea that states are able to do what they like to their citizens without reprimand from the international community has continued to be eroded since the atrocities witnessed during the Second World War and the Holocaust.[11] This erosion is not exclusive to Western nations; individual and group human rights were recognized in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration. Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter in 1945 recognized “crimes against humanity,” and since 1948, 141 countries have either ratified or acceded the Genocide Convention into domestic law.[12] It thus follows that over the years, non-Western countries have felt it necessary to become involved in another nation’s affairs under the pretext of human rights protection. In 1971, the Indian government sent troops into East Pakistan in order to stop the Pakistani army from massacring their own civilians.[13] Some reports estimated that up to seven thousand people were murdered in just one night, with around one million dead in total, before Prime Minister Indira Ghandi decided to take armed action following failed appeals to the international community.[14] Similarly, Tanzania sent in their army to intervene in the neighboring country of Uganda in 1978, in order to overthrow the dictator Idi Amin Dada, who had caused over one hundred thousand deaths to his own people.[15] These examples are just a few of many, in which it is evident that non-western countries have embraced their own forms of humanitarian intervention and the concept of responsibility to protect. Due to the collective nature of human rights agreements and beliefs, the idea of intervention is clearly not a new one, thus the foundation of Responsibility to Protect is based in ideas that are not purely Western. However, it is important to acknowledge that Responsibility to Protect is not the same as humanitarian intervention. Although there is no doubt that the root of R2P lies in this model, the concept itself has transmuted due to significant changes in international politics during the 1990s. Despite the acknowledgment of important fundamental human rights in international law following World War Two, the UN Charter and founders of the UN were predominately preoccupied with preventing wars between states due to the political climate of the period, and thus any norm on humanitarian intervention was never considered in any real depth.[16] From a Realist perspective, the end of the Cold War and America’s new status as sole hegemon in 1990 brought this question into the center of international political debate, and it is from this debate that the modern concept of R2P sprung.
The dawn of the nineties saw a dramatic change in international politics; the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the rise of the United States of America to unrivaled world power, as well as a significant move from interstate war to intrastate conflict involving civil war, internal violence and genocide. Cold War structures and customs were no longer relevant, and superpower constraints were removed, leaving in its wake new sovereign states who were finally able to pursue their own domestic policies free from the pressures of rival power blocs.[17] Failure to intervene in a number of humanitarian tragedies, such as Somalia in 1993, the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 and the ethnic cleansing throughout the Balkans in 1995, saw the emergence and debate over the idea of a ‘responsibility to protect.’[18] There is, in fact, much reason to believe that the concept of R2P was brought about by Western guilt over their failure to prevent mass death and catastrophe in these cases, evident through a number of notable quotations from important Western political players at this time. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, labeled Rwanda a “sin of omission.”[19] Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly stated that “if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away as the outside has done many times before,” also claiming that it was the West’s “moral duty” to provide humanitarian assistance in such cases.[20] It was at the end of this decade that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was initiated by the Canadian government. In 2000, then Prime Minister of Canada Jean Chretien, gave the high- profile ICISS the task of establishing consensus on the humanitarian intervention question.[21] The report that was produced by the Commission expanded upon the principle of‘sovereignty as responsibility’ as outlined by Francis Deng and collaborators in Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa,[22] indicating that the original concept of R2P was coined by Western thinkers and initiated by a Western nation.[23] Furthermore, the suggestion of Responsibility to Protect was received most favorably by liberal democratic, or Western nations, with the likes of Canada, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom having the greatest support for the ICISS’ report.[24] The United States, although aiming to distance itself from this report, has also articulated a similar form of‘sovereignty as responsibility’ through its domestic policy on rogue states.[25] As has been expressed earlier in this paper, the ICISS report was later adopted by the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit with one hundred and fifty countries signatory to this event.[26] This fact seems to demonstrate that perhaps the concept of R2P is not entirely Western. However, the volume of signatories to this concept is not as straightforward as it may seem. In early 2008, Latin American, Arab and African delegates attending the United Nation’s budget committee stated that the concept of R2P had not been accepted or approved by the General Assembly in 2005.[27] It has also since been stated that the consensus at the World Summit was “shallow” and has been undermined by America’s interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, justified on humanitarian terms.[28] In addition, five years before the World Summit, non-Western nations rejected the “right of intervention” at the Group of 77 South Summit in Havana.[29] This was the most elite meeting that had been held thus far in history between the Group 77 and China – an alliance that consists of eighty percent of the world’s population.[30] The ICISS and Western countries largely ignored the outcome of this Summit in 2005, demonstrating again that the concept and support of R2P is Western.[31] More recently, non-western countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have refused to vote in favor of the intervention in Libya in 2011, due to support for a policy of non-intervention. With NATO’s use of the United Nations mandate in Libya as justification for the regime change, these countries reinforced their position behind a program of non-interventionist international affairs.[32] Even its ellipsis, R2P, is tailored to a Western population; as Joshua Muravchik states“it has been given a textable, Tweetable acronym.”[33] Thus, it is evident that despite the origins of R2P stemming from far more universal principles and international law, this new and modern take on humanitarian intervention is a strictly Western concept.
The fact that R2P is a Western concept has had big affects on its implementation, specifically in relation to international institutions that are necessary for the execution of Responsibility to Protect and that are largely controlled by the West. The United Nations is arguably the most influential international institution, and it is through this body that the concept of R2P is enacted. As set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the authority to employ intervention on humanitarian grounds as a “last resort” rests solely with the UN Security Council, and failing this in very extreme cases, the General Assembly.[34] On its face, it appears that this is an effective safeguard for the non-Western world against R2P being utilized as a tool for the interests of Western nations. However, there are large problems with this conferral, as it should be noted that pre-R2P, there were only two occasions where the United Nations was able to “legally” intervene in the affairs of sovereign states – in Korea in 1950 and more recently, in Kuwait in 1991.[35] In other words, it was on these two occasions that all five of the permanent members of the UN Security Council agreed that intervention was a necessary cause of action. In these cases, the Security Council had no force of their own, and thus had to form a group under Article 51, that gives states the right of individual or collective self-defense.[36] The United States led these forces in both instances. Thus, having all authority placed with the UN Security Council makes it extremely difficult to act in cases of humanitarian emergency. [37] These concerns are only augmented by the unrepresentative nature of the UN’s Security Council, and the veto power that is all too often used to further the interests of the permanent five members, instead of placing humanitarian concerns first. For example, bargaining and tradeoffs are commonplace between the permanent five members. A prime example of this occurred in 1994, where France, America and Russia each had conflicting interests in intervening in Rwanda, Haiti and Georgia. These P5 powers each exchanged their vote on one country’s desired intervention, for support on its own preferred campaign.[38] Furthermore, the concept and implementation of R2P will be forever flawed, as strong nations such as America and China have no risk of intervention into their sovereign affairs, regardless of whether they engage in human rights violations.[39] Additionally, Western nations, in particular the United States, are the only nations with enough power and resources to be able to implement the policy of R2P. Overall, the fact that R2P is a Western concept, and that international institutions control the use of this doctrine with a strong Western influence, has many visible affects on its implementation. Further, due to this Westernized implementation, its effectiveness as a policy may have diminished due to decreasing faith in the idea by non-Western states. Particularly following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there has been much criticism of the model, with critics claiming that R2P is a form of “neo-imperialism,” and is being used as an excuse for powerful western nations to become involved in the internal affairs of other sovereigns under the pretense of humanitarian intervention. This perception is embodied well in the following quote from a journalist from Colombo in 2007: “The so-called responsibility to protect is nothing but a license for the white man to himself intervene in the affairs of dark sovereign countries, whenever the white man thinks it fit to do so.”[40] The interventions in both Darfur and Iraq seem to have contributed to such criticisms, and there does appear to be much evidence that supports the idea of the West using humanitarian concerns as a “Trojan Horse”,[41] most evident through the interventions in both Iraq and Darfur. The invasion of Iraq following the September 11 attacks was justified on humanitarian terms, yet is more commonly thought to be a justification for neo-imperial ambitions, as well as the pursuit of oil and the infamous “war on terror.”[42] Similarly, the Darfur crisis seemed to reflect the United States opportunistically implementing the “R2P” card, intervening in the strategically positioned Sudan, which also happened to offer a non-Middle Eastern source of oil.[43] This applies as much to times when Western nations did not deem it necessary to intervene in humanitarian emergencies; an argument common amongst African countries alleges that the West is less likely to intervene in their countries as there is a lack of economic or political interest in these areas.[44] This selectivity in intervention seems as though it will be demonstrated in the most recent crisis in Syria, where thus far, the United States and allies have shown little inclination to intervene for a variety of reasons, augmenting the argument that R2P is simply a modern form of imperialism.[45] Thus, it seems apparent that dominant Western powers have the ability to utilize R2P in a variety of means to further their own gains, owing to their control over international institutions, and more fundamentally, due to the fact that Responsibility to Protect is essentially a Western concept. Thus, the effectiveness of R2P suffers, as non-Western nations are less likely to support and endorse a program that they believe is simply an excuse for the West to legally intervene in their sovereign affairs.
In conclusion, it is not straightforward to answer whether the concept of Responsibility to Protect is a Western one. It is evident that the theories that lie behind R2P; international ethics and humanitarian intervention, are not of a purely Western nature, but instead, are evidenced to have existed throughout many cultures in history. Despite this, R2P is a very modern interpretation of these ancient pedigrees, and as a result of the political climate of the nineteenth and twentieth century, has been developed into a Western concept. This has led to an affect on its ability to be implemented, namely due to the imbalances and faults manifest in the operation of the United Nations. Further, the control that the West has over this program has led to skepticism in non-Western countries, who believe, to an extent rightly so, that the West is simply using R2P as a cover for neo-imperialist objectives. However even if R2P has appeared to be misused by the West in some instances, the concept is one that should not be avoided in a globalized society, where tragedies such as the Rwandan genocide can and should be prevented.
Acheson-Brown, Daniel G. (2001) ‘The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?,’ International Third World Studies Journal and Review, Vol. 12, pp. 1-11.
Australian Red Cross (2011)‘International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility to Protect: A Handbook,’Australian Red Cross. <> [Accessed 10 May 2012].
The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War?
Invasion of State Sovereignty or Preservation of Human Rights?
Authored By: Brandon R. Newhart
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Invasion of State Sovereignty or Preservation of Human Rights?
It is commonly understood among international political and legal scholars that intrastate humanitarian crises pose serious threats to the stability of the affected nation’s political regime and internal stability. However, within this age of rapid globalization and internationalization of human rights, concerns stemming from these intrastate conflicts are no longer isolated. Instead, intrastate humanitarian conflicts have had significant impact upon international political economies and relations between nations facing oppression and civil strife and their respective political allies and trade partners. In addition to concerns facing states who have suffered adversely due to sustained relations with a state encumbered by humanitarian conflicts, such internal crises have also led to further strains on political relations within the larger international community as various polarizing responses and official statements by outside nations regarding resolution of these crises have resulted in tensions between nations maintaining divergent stances regarding such conflicts. As a result, providing effective solutions to humanitarian conflicts is a matter of increasing importance for maintaining international peace and stability. But what solutions are available to address these concerns? Many international scholars, in addition to a growing number of world leaders and heads of state, have suggested humanitarian intervention as a means to remedy various human rights crises. However, there remain many questions about the validity of the utilizing humanitarian intervention under international law in preventing or ending human rights abuses. Moreover, even among proponents of humanitarian intervention, there is considerable disagreement as to how a state or group of states should intervene within an affected nation, whether a state may act unilaterally in 2 intervening to prevent further intrastate conflicts, and whether a state or group of states may act without the approval of the United Nations Security Council, if the state or group of states feels that such action is necessary to immediately prevent further humanitarian loses. This paper investigates the legality and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, primarily examining the use of unilateral humanitarian intervention to resolve intrastate conflicts, to determine whether a state may or should act unilaterally and without the approval of the United Nations Security Council to immediately address pressing humanitarian concerns.
Defining Humanitarian Intervention
As there is no general consensus among international legal scholars regarding whether intervention should be utilized to prevent further intrastate humanitarian conflicts, there is additionally no consensus among these scholars towards an accepted definition of humanitarian intervention. However, among the multitude of meanings for which various international actions have been categorized under this term, there are three generally recurring situations for which humanitarian intervention is conceptualized:
1.Humanitarian emergency help which is provided in cases of (environmental)disaster without the approval of the state where the disaster takes place;
2.Enforcement actions for humanitarian purposes which occurs when multilateral interventions take place mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VIIof the United Nations Charter to protect the populace in general, or a minority in particular, from gross violations of human rights; and
3.Interventions by one or more states on the territory of a third state by using or threatening the use of armed force, in reaction to or prevention of massive and gross violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, without United Nations Security Council mandate.
In conceptualizing humanitarian intervention through these scenarios, this approach expands such intervention to include a broad spectrum of political, economic, and military actions by one state against another. However, for purposes of this paper, a working definition of “humanitarian intervention” will be limited to instances described within the third scenario above. By limiting humanitarian intervention in this manner, inquiry of this state action will be limited primarily to military interventions that are not sanctioned by the United Nations, although they may be later ratified by resolution or statements from other members within this international organization. One of the most commonly cited definitions of“humanitarian intervention” comes from J.L. Holzgrefe, for which he states humanitarian intervention is:
The threat or use of force across state borders by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.
Under this definition, a state that intervenes necessarily intrudes upon another state’s territorial sovereignty by not first acquiring permission of the state responsible for various human rights abuses. Additionally, in restricting the definition of “humanitarian intervention” to include only “widespread and grave violations of the fundamental right of individuals other than its own citizens” that an intervening state may preserve , Holzgrefe’s conceptualization of this term prohibits “self -help” actions by one state that involves entry into another such as rescuing of hostages, trans-boundary actions by non-governmental organizations, or military actions by one state on behalf of the government of a third state. Consequently, for an intervention to qualify as “humanitarian”under this framework, the objective of such state action must primarily be abatement or prevention of further human rights violations, and not socio-political or economic
A unilaterally intervening state, when practicable, shall recruit, organize, and assemble military forces comprising of individuals within the affected state for the primary purpose of preventing or abating further grave and widespread violations of fundamental human rights of individuals within the affected state.
A unilaterally intervening state must resort to the use of force only when necessary to prevent or abate further grave and widespread violations of fundamental human rights of individuals within the affected state.
A unilaterally intervening state when applying the use of force within the affected state must act in compliance with provisions within the Third Geneva Convention and customary international laws of war.
A unilaterally intervening state after intervening or applying the use of force within the affected state, shall address both regional international organizations of which the affected state is a member and the United Nations within a reasonable times periodically to present the status of resolution of humanitarian concerns within the affected state.
A unilaterally intervening state shall remove military forces within the affected state at the earliest reasonable convenience following the end of hostilities intended to resolve humanitarian concerns within the affected state, unless otherwise ordered by the United Nations or regional international groups of which the affected state is a member following resolution of humanitarian concerns within the third state. Ultimate deference is to be given first to the United Nations and secondly to regional international groups of which the affected state is a member in the case of conflicting orders between these international organizations. Compliance with the above principles by a state seeking unilateral military intervention within another state for humanitarian justifications is likely the best and only means towards gaining international acceptance of this type of state action. In allowing unilateral military intervention as a last resort for a state only after first seeking diplomatic or non-violent solutions from either international organizations or leaders within the affected state, these principles alleviate concerns that international acceptance of unilateral humanitarian intervention would lead to unrestrained and unwarranted invasions upon the territorial sovereignty of another state without justifications given to the international community for these actions. Additionally, by limiting the use of force by an intervening state to only when necessary to abate or prevent humanitarian crises, these principles further address concerns among the international community regarding self-interested motives of a unilateral actor when intervening within an affected state by restricting all military actions within this state to those consistent solely with resolving humanitarian crises within the affected state. Moreover, these motivational concerns by the international community are also addressed by language within the above principles allowing the civilians affected state to take organized action against its own oppressors relying on the aid of the intervening state, while within the same instance limiting the influence of the intervening state upon internal political processes, by requiring the intervening state to remove its forces from the affected state at the earliest convenience following resolution of humanitarian crises. Ultimately, the above principles allow a state to act quickly and unilaterally in the absence of international response, to abate or prevent further humanitarian crises within an affected state through the use of, while still deferring both to the United Nations to prevent the recurrence of humanitarian crises within an affected state, and laws of war and other sources of international laws to conduct humanitarian responses in a lawful manner. As demonstrated within this paper, unilateral humanitarian interventions by one state into another are still a source of considerable concern within the international community. Fears of both Hitler’s invasion of the Sudetenland and Russia’s continued military presence and support of separatist groups within Georgia have caused many states within the international community to look with skepticism towards humanitarian justifications given by a state seeking to unilaterally intervene within another state. However, with proper conditions placed upon unilateral humanitarian intervention, this state action may prove effective in quickly abating or preventing further human rights abuses within an affected state in a manner in which delayed multilateral or international responses may not be able. Therefore, in order to provide an effective unilateral alternative for abating or preventing further humanitarian crises, international legal lawmakers should consider defining procedural constraints for executing lawful unilateral humanitarian interventions instead of generally dismissing this doctrine due to its complicated application, in order to best uphold the duty of the international community to put an end to fundamental violations of human rights.
J.L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and PoliticalDilemmas, 18 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., Cambridge University Press 2003).
Years: 1978-1979
Battle deaths: 4,000 [1]
Published prior to 2013 | Altered: 2013-08-15 11:44:53
The Uganda–Tanzania war (usually referred to in Uganda as the Liberation War) was fought between Uganda and Tanzania in 1978–1979, and led to the overthrow of Idi Amin’s regime. Idi Amin’s forces included thousands of troops sent by Muammar Gaddafi, and some Palestinian support.

Source: Wikipedia, published under the GNU FDL. Retrieved 2013-07-30

The armed conflict between Tanzania and Uganda concerned the so-called Kagera Salient, an 1800-square km strip of Tanzanian territory in the northwestern-most part of the country, bordering Uganda. While the territory had been claimed by Uganda many times before, it was not until in November 1978 that the country launched an invasion and declared the Salient to be an integral part of Uganda. After a Tanzanian counter-attack in mid-November the Ugandan forces were eventually pushed out of the region.
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