Friday, September 27,
2013
Why we must reform security agencies now
A KDF officer leaves the
Westgate mall aboard an armoured vehicle on September 25, 2013. Photo/DENISH
OCHIENG
A KDF officer leaves the Westgate mall aboard an armoured vehicle on September 25, 2013. Photo/DENISH OCHIENG
By MUTUMA RUTERE
Last weekend’s attack on the Westgate Mall is a catastrophic reminder that the threat of terrorism still prowls the country.
In the last several months, there has been a drop in violent attacks in northern Kenya, possibly lulling us into a false sense of security.
Westgate is a reminder that Kenya remains a soft target for international terrorists. As a country that has waged war against al-Shabaab in Somalia, we may forget that we are top on the list of the terror group’s target.
Kenya has done little to address the threat, even in the face of the evidence that al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda would retaliate against the military onslaught into Somalia.
Analysts, political leaders and the public have raised critical questions on the preparedness and effectiveness of our security agencies in preventing and dealing with such attacks.
There is no question that the mall attack represents a failure of intelligence or failure to act on intelligence both in Kenya and globally. Forensic audit of those failures will certainly be done in various world capitals. Whether Kenya will take a serious evaluation of these blunders and take measures to prevent a repeat is what is critical.
Obviously, it is too early and the pain too fresh for any of us to rush to judgment on what went wrong. From the outset, the selfless dedication and commitment to save lives by security officers was exemplary.
Officers who rushed into the mall and endured the horror are some of the least paid and least appreciated public servants. Their heroism and humanity should not be glossed over even as the inevitable and necessary questions are raised over how this kind of attack could have been executed in the most watched malls in the country.
Parliament has pledged to open an inquiry, and hopefully, that will provide the much-needed insight into security lapses. However, as we await that inquiry, it is important to caution that temptation to rush to judgment against any single institution, whether the National Intelligence Service or the Kenya Police Service, should be avoided.
The study of disasters has shown that no single mistake is usually responsible for catastrophic flops. It is often the cumulative consequences of many institutional weaknesses and failures that often cascade into large scale death and destruction.
It will be remembered that the 2009 Ransley Report on police reforms underscored the need to invest in intelligence-led policing, better intelligence sharing between agencies and improvements to make intelligence into clear and useful basis to stop or prevent crime.
Beyond this, a more forward-looking assessment of the country’s preparedness in addressing security threats is necessary.
In particular, there is need to pay close attention and breathe new life into the unfinished business of reforms. There is a view gaining currency that police reforms may be losing steam with the leadership lost in bureaucratic sideshows. Since the death of (Cabinet Minister) George Saitoti, government reforms do not seem to have any effective salesperson.
Wrongly, there is sometimes a perception that police reforms is merely about accountability and punishing rogue officers. In reality, the bulk of the reforms proposed by the Ransley Report are about improving effectiveness of the police to fulfil their mandate professionally.
The Criminal Investigations Department remains woefully underfunded and the re-skilling of officers to prepare them for intelligence-led police has not yet been undertaken. In the absence of an investment into creation of a 21st century police service, temptation to resort to crude force appears to be creeping back.
In addition, we need to revisit the country’s counter-terrorism strategy. There have been some suggestions that a community policing approach will correct some of the weaknesses and plug some gaps in intelligence gathering on terror threats. Community policing is now secured in the legislation as the preferred approach.
However, community policing remains something everybody likes, but no one knows how it looks like. Arming neighbourhood watches is not community policing as some suggest. Nor is recruitment of crime spotters by police. There is need to put flesh onto the bones of the legislation and policy, spelling out what community policing is.
It is also time to open the debate on Parliamentary oversight in security. So far, security agencies have largely operated in secrecy, choosing to designate virtually everything as secret and classified.
In a democracy like ours, security cannot be entirely left in the hands of experts within the police. A mechanism needs to be put in place to ensure that the respective parliamentary committee has the security clearance to see some of the intelligence gathered by police and the NIS. This calls for a system of classification of intelligence with appropriate penalties to deter leaders who may be tempted to play partisan politics with classified information.
Even after many warnings regarding Westgate and indeed other soft targets, it is clear we have not done anything significant beyond the routine checks by guards on entry.
It is obvious to most people accessing such places that unless one is carrying a conspicuous object openly labelled “bomb”, it is impossible for the checks by guards to discover concealed explosives.
The public and parliamentary scrutiny trained on the police and intelligence services overlooks the role of private security guards who are, in fact, in the frontline in securing shopping malls and other public places. The private security industry operates without regulations on training and little is done to ascertain the background of the guards. Arming private security guards, as some analysts and political leaders have suggested, should be considered.
Moreover, it is obvious that even gun-toting guards could not have stopped attackers as heavily armed as those who raided the mall. Regrettably, the Private Security Industry Regulation Bill prepared by the defunct Police Reforms Implementation Committee in 2010 has never found its way into Parliament.
The lessons of the Westgate tragedy also point to the critical role landlords play in security as they determine who can and who cannot access their premises. Rightly, security agencies need to investigate the Westgate Mall tenants.
The more important issue, however, is to regulate tenancy and purchase of properties. Currently, there are no requirements for landlords to conduct background checks on prospective tenants. Anyone with money can let property virtually anywhere without tripping any security alerts.
Investment in data collection, scrutiny and verification of every prospective tenant should be seen as central to the counter-terrorism strategy.
This is not the role of the police or intelligence, but rather county governments. Those who assume that county governments do not have security functions because they don’t control police confuse police for security and institutions for outcomes.
It is important to remember that terrorist attacks have been taking place in many parts of northern Kenya. Eastleigh and the Coast province have also suffered attacks most of last year.
For a country that is so vulnerable and with such a high incidence of attacks, it is remarkable that data, research and analysis of this violence remains limited.
Institutions such as the National Crime Research Centre that have the mandate to provide leadership in research and analysis on crime have failed.
Of course, and as we have come to expect, our universities have nothing to say about these contemporary security problems and the less said about their relevance the better.
Unfortunately, without analysis and thinking on safety measures located outside the security agencies, we are unlikely to see any new thinking in dealing with our security problems.
As the great science philosopher Thomas Kuhn wrote, ‘paradigm-shifting ideas do not come from veterans in any field but from those on the outside or newcomers.’
To expect security agencies to boldly reform themselves is to fundamentally misunderstand human nature and behaviour. No one will reform themselves into irrelevance.
Dr Mutuma Ruteere writes on security issues. mruteere@gmail.com
Leaked NIS document details terrorist plots of an attack in Nairobi between September 13 and 21
Updated Friday, September 27th 2013 at 22:37 GMT +3
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| Director General of NIS Major General Michael Gichangi in deep thought during a past national ceremony. He is due to appear before a House committee on Monday [PHOTO:COLLINS KWEYU/STANDARD] |
An unprecedented leak of Intelligence briefings covering the past year paint the picture of a government fully informed of an impending Al Shabaab attack ahead of the Westgate massacre.
The leak, coming days before the National Intelligence Service ( NIS) Director General Michael Gichangi is grilled by MPs on Monday, appears to draw a line in the sand as accusations are traded over the responsibility for the attack in which at least 67 were killed.
The 8,800-word dossier details terrorist plots and other activities by the militant group, including a direct warning of a terror plot in Nairobi between September 13 and 21.
This is likely to be Gichangi’s line of defence when he appears before the Defence and Foreign Relations Committee. If Gichangi’s assertions cut ice, the tide could turn against other security organs and senior officials who must answer question as to what they did or did not with the Intelligence provided.
Intelligence gap
At a closed-door meeting of a joint committee of the House that is investigating the matter, the MPs admonished Gichangi for Intelligence gaps and security lapses that allowed terrorists to plan and execute the bloody attack.
Defence and Foreign Relations Committee chairman Ndung’u Gethenji said “it is now time for people to take responsibility and to audit our security system.”
The Intelligence leak claims that a security survey on key installations and shopping malls, including Westgate, essentially assessed their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and the requisite recommendations made.
Reports by NIS are normally shared with Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph ole Lenku and his PS Mutea Iringo, Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Kimemia (meaning President Uhuru Kenyatta must have been briefed), Inspector General David Kimaiyo and his two deputies and CID boss Ndegwa Muhoro.
NIS submitted a Situation Report dated September 21, 2002 — Serial No.184/2012 — which indicated that at least three suspected terrorists were in Nairobi planning suicide attacks on undisclosed dates.
“The following suspected Al Shabaab operatives are in Nairobi and are planning to mount suicide attacks on undisclosed date, targeting Westgate Mall and Holy Family Basilica; Sheikh Abdiwelli Mohamed, Sheikh Hussein and Sheikh Hassan. They are believed to be in possession of two suicide vests, twelve (12) hand grenades and two (2) AK47 rifles, and have already surveyed the two targets.”
“They are being assisted by Sheikh Hassan alias Blackie of Majengo and Omar Ahmed Ali alias Jerry who are currently staying near Mamba Petrol Station and Huruma Mosque along Juja Road,” the report said.
Political assassinations
The same report indicated that two suspected Al Shabaab terrorists of Somali origin had entered South Sudan through Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan and were suspected to be in Uganda on transit to Kenya through either Busia or Malaba border points. The two were allegedly being assisted by Teskalem Teklemaryan, an Eritrean engineer who lives in Uganda and South Sudan.
The Intelligence report further advised that the duo had purchased one GPMG, four hand-grenades, one bullet belt, five AK 47 guns and unknown number of bulletproof jackets from Joseph Lomoro, an SPLA officer, and some maps of Nairobi.
The report further disclosed that one Maalim Khalid (also known as Maalim Kenya), a Kenyan explosives and martial arts expert, had been identified as the architect of current terrorist attacks in the country. Khalid, the report indicated, is associated with attacks at Machakos Country Bus, Assanands House in Nairobi and Bellavista Club in Mombasa.
He was reported to have selected 20 Kenyans in groups of 10, whom he trained at Marka and Barawe to drive, use of pistols and grenades, establish and utilise safe houses, escape and evasion tactics and effective and secure communication.
NIS’s advice to the government then was that Khalid was planning terrorist attacks in Kenya, aimed at damaging the economy, assassination of political and security leaders, and attacking Western interests and tourists.
“Elsewhere, the Al Shabaab is contemplating attacking Kenyan interests in other countries, starting with Zambia, but the timing, target and methods are still unclear. Kenyan interests anywhere in the world, therefore, remain the militant’s potential targets of attack as the Kenya Defence Forces and AMISOM exert pressure on them, and the imminent capture of Kismayu,” reads the report.
The report further established that an Al Shabaab operative, Musharaf Abdalla (also known as Zarkawi, Ali Abdalla, Musab, Shukri Abdirahman, Rashid, Noor Abdi Ismail, Alex Shikanda), who had been arrested on September 29, 2012 in Malindi, had disclosed that his associates were targeting Florida 2000, a club opposite Hilton Hotel (assessed to be Bettyz) and unidentified strip club near Nation Centre.
Changamwe refinery
Another NIS situation report dated November 9, 2012 —serial No 219/2012 — indicated that one Titus Amusibwa alias Maalim Khalid, a terrorist suspect linked to the Al Shabaab and who was arrested with arms at Mariakani on October 27, 2012, had been found with information indicating that the terror group intended to attack the Kenya Pipeline network. The planned attacks were meant to reinforce the one against Changamwe Oil Refinery for maximum damage.
Another Intelligence brief titled “Situation Report for 13.09.13 - Serial no. 178/2013” indicated that one Mohamed Ade, who is based in Kenya, sent fraudulent refugee documents to 15 Al Shabaab Amniyat operatives in Somalia in early September 2013 to enable them access refugee camps in Kenya and thereafter move to other parts of the country.
The cards, according to the reports, were handed to Abdullahi Dheere who would then pass them over to Aynanshe, the Al Shabaab Governor in Middle Juba.
The operatives, said the brief, had undergone a Swahili language course and were under the command of Moalin Ali and were to enter Kenya by mid-September this year.
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Thursday, September 26, 2013
Blame game over Westgate attack
A section of the Westgate Mall that collapsed during the final assault on suspected Al-Shabaab attackers by the Kenya security forces. PHOTO | KDF
In Summary
- Inquiries by the Nation indicate that a coordinated rescue mission was badly delayed because of disputes between the Kenya Police and KDF officers commanding their units on the ground.
- It took prolonged consultations that also involved State House before President Kenyatta publicly announced that Inspector-General of Police David Kimaiyo was in charge.
By NATION TEAM
Rivalry among security agencies and lack of clear command lines badly affected the response to the terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall, the Nation has established.
Jurisdictional differences appear to have extended to blame games among security agencies, as Kenya recovers from its worst terror attack since the 1998 bombing of the Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi.
Various units of the Kenya Police and the Kenya Defence Forces played key roles in the rescue operation after a band of terrorists linked to Somalia-based Al-Shabaab attacked the shopping mall on Saturday and killed dozens before holding an unknown number hostage inside the up-market complex.
Inquiries by the Nation indicate that a coordinated rescue mission was badly delayed because of disputes between the Kenya Police and KDF officers commanding their units on the ground.
A reconstruction of the rescue mission indicates that a team from the Recce General Service Unit of the Kenya Police early in the rescue operation made its way into the mall and secured most of it, pinning down the terrorists at one end around Nakumatt Supermarket and Barclays Bank.
Rooftop parking
However, the team pulled out after its commander was fatally shot in ‘friendly fire’ following the arrival of a KDF unit.
Also pulling out at the same time was a small group of policemen from various units and armed civilians, who were the first to enter the mall from the rooftop parking and the front entrance and led hundreds of shoppers to safety.
The pullout left a vacuum that apparently allowed the terrorists to regroup and move through the mall slaughtering many captives.
It also allowed the terrorists to deploy heavy-calibre machine guns that they had not used in the earlier shootout.
It took prolonged consultations that also involved State House before President Kenyatta publicly announced that Inspector-General of Police David Kimaiyo was in charge.
However, it was also decided that KDF Special Forces would be the ones to conduct the actual assault on the terrorists, while the GSU and other police units ringed the mall.
The soldiers and their commanders on the ground only answered to KDF chief General Julius Karangi rather than to the police boss, which also complicated the operation.
The teams also appeared to have had different aims. One officer involved said that some units had a priority to locate and rescue a specific group of VIPs.
The teams also appeared to have had different aims. One officer involved said that some units had a priority to locate and rescue a specific group of VIPs.
Barely an hour after the attack, the GSU squad had taken control of almost 70 per cent of the building after moving in to reinforce the small group of policemen, who were the first to enter the building.
The KDF Special Forces came in later to spearhead the operation, with the GSU forming the second inner cordon in the mall behind the army units from the 20 Para Battalion and Maroon Commandos.
The rivalry is understood to have extended to communication on how the public would be informed of the progress of the operation.
As Parliament promised to demand answers from all units involved, it also emerged on Wednesday that the police had been given advance intelligence on the planned terrorist attack, but failed to act.
The Parliamentary Defence Committee Thursday summoned all security chiefs — including National Intelligence Service boss Michael Gichangi—to appear before it next week. The sessions are expected to be dominated by buck-passing.
“The time for responsibility and accountability has come,” Defence Committee chairman Ndung’u Gethenji said.
Likely targets
A local newspaper Thursday quoted an intelligence source claiming Maj-Gen Gichangi had passed information to Mr Kimaiyo and CID director Ndegwa Muhoro on the impending attack on Westgate.
Speaking to the Nation Thursday, however, a highly-placed source within the police denied that such information was ever passed on.
He said all the communication logs and situation reports had been cross-checked in the wake of the attack and confirmed that no such report was ever made.
What was on record in the recent past, he insisted, were the regular alerts on terrorist plots and likely targets such as government buildings, city landmarks and high-rise buildings, tourist hotels, up-market shopping malls frequented by diplomats and expatriates, and western embassies.
From the debate in Parliament in the wake of the attack, it also appears some MPs have already decided who to blame for the security lapse.
Meanwhile, intelligence officers are pursuing leads indicating that a terrorist who is already serving a 59-year jail term was in contact from behind prison walls with the group that planned and carried out the Westgate attack.
Abdimajid Yassin Mohammed was last year jailed after pleading guilty to the charges of terrorism. It is believed that some warders at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison allowed him to communicate with the conspirators outside.
Suicide mission
Mr Mohammed, 26, and a colleague reportedly bought a Peugeot 505 car for Sh180,000 and did not bother to ask for the log book.
They had planned to use it for a suicide mission on Parliament, but the car broke down on September 13 as they set out on their operation.
They were arrested with four suicide bomb belts, 12 hand grenades, four AK 47 rifles, 481 bullets and two home-made bombs. They led police to a flat in Nairobi’s Eastleigh area where some of the arsenal was recovered.
Mr Mohammed, 26, and a colleague reportedly bought a Peugeot 505 car for Sh180,000 and did not bother to ask for the log book.
They had planned to use it for a suicide mission on Parliament, but the car broke down on September 13 as they set out on their operation.
They were arrested with four suicide bomb belts, 12 hand grenades, four AK 47 rifles, 481 bullets and two home-made bombs. They led police to a flat in Nairobi’s Eastleigh area where some of the arsenal was recovered.
They also confessed that they were sent to Kenya by Jafra Hussein, an Al-Shabaab commander in Mogadishu.
COMMENTS:
Friday, September 27, 2013
Something does not smell right here. I'll know what it is if somebody tries to use this tragedy to ask for the postponement of ICC cases.
Concerned
Sorry, I meant Abdul Haji's interview and not Majid's interview.
Really? Only the armu could deal with the bombs, machine guns, grenades and so on. The cops would have been mowed down with their WW2 guns. Even Recee Squad was no match for these jihadists. Only special forces from the military.
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