Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report

Good People,

This Report carries with it some credible information Both Kikwete and Kabila

need to have in their possession; and as well proceed to ICC Hague without

wasting any more time........so, Kabila should face Pay-Back time and return

plus compensate what he stole from Congo.

Some situations are best handled before legal justice for reparation.

Judy Miriga

Diaspora Spokesperson &

Executive Director for

Confederation Council Foundation for Africa

USA

http://socioeconomicforum50.blogspot.com

email: jbatec@yahoo.com

Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report

M23 Chief Executioner, Colonel Sultani Makenga marketing his trade

Rwandan Defense Forces, under the cover of Congolese rebels known as M23, have started their 2,000-mile long march to the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kinshasa.
According to our sources within Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), the order to march on Kinshasa was given on June 30, 2012 in a final meeting between General Paul Kagame of Rwanda, ex-CNDP Commander General Laurent Nkunda and Rwandan top military leaders, including Defense Minister General James Kabarebe, Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga, and General Paul Kagame’s intelligence and security adviser, General Jack Nziza. The march started on July 1, 2012 when the last unit of close to 3,000 Rwandan troops crossed the border into the DRC on the night of June 30th to reinforce 2,000 troops already supporting M23.

m23 Cadre waiting for orders from Rwanda

There’s enough evidence by the Group of Experts Interim report on the Democratic Republic of Congo,
that proves how Rwanda and its Prodigal Son, Bosco Ntaganda aka The Terminator are ploting a new frenzy of criminality in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Throughout the Group’s investigations, it has systematically gathered testimonies from former M23 combatants, M23 collaborators, ex-RDF officers, Congolese intelligence, FARDC commanders, and politicians which affirm the direct involvement in the support to M23 from senior levels of the Rwandan government.
a)General Jacques Nziza, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, supervises all military, financial, and logistic support as well as mobilization activities related to M23. He has recently been deployed to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to coordinate M23 assistance and recruitment.
b)General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan Minister of Defense, with the support of his personal secretary Captain Celestin Senkoko, also is a central figure in recruitment and mobilizing political and military support to M23. Kabarebe has often been in direct contact with M23 members on the ground to coordinate military activities.
c)General Charles Kayonga, the RDF Chief of Staff manages the overall military support to M23. Kayonga is frequently in communication with Makenga and oversaw the transfer of Makenga’s troops and weapons through Rwanda.

Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report

Criminal Paul Kagame and Bosco Ntaganda’s Crew

d) The military support on the ground has been channeled by General Emmanuel Ruvusha, RDF Division commander based in Gisenyi, as well as General Alexi Kagame, RDF Division commander based at Ruhengeri. Both facilitate recruitment of civilians and demobilized soldiers to M23 as well as coordinating RDF reinforcements in Runyoni with M23 commanders.
e)Colonel Jomba Gakumba, a native of North Kivu, who used to be an RDF instructor at the Rwandan Military Academy at Gako, was redeployed to Ruhengeri since the creation of M23, where he has been in charge of commanding locally military operations in support of M23.

M23 is using Rwandan territory and benefiting
directly from Rwanda Defence Forces facilitation

READ FULL UN REPORT OF EXPERTS

http://freeuganda.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/un-report-of-experts.pdf

Security Council

Distr.: General

15 November 2012

Original: English

12-59339 (E) 201112

*1259339*

Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the

Security Council Committee established pursuant to

resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the

Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to

resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in

accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), I have the

honour to submit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).

In this connection, I would appreciate if the present letter, together with its

annex, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and

issued as a document of the Council.

(

Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev

Chair

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Annex

Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group of Experts

on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the

Chair of the Security Council Committee established

pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the

Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in

pursuance of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011).

(

Signed) Steven Hege

(

Signed) Nelson Alusala

(

Signed) Ruben de Koning

(

Signed) Marie Plamadiala

(

Signed) Emilie Serralta

(Signed) Steven Spittaels

Executive summary

The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains plagued by

dozens of foreign and national armed groups. Instability has increased

since the mutiny by former members of the Congrès national pour la

défense du peuple and the subsequent creation of the Mouvement du

23 mars (M23) earlier in 2012. The rebels expanded their control over

Rutshuru territory with extensive foreign support in July 2012 and have

recently taken advantage of an informal ceasefire to enhance alliances

and command proxy operations elsewhere.

The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo

by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating

recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed

forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms,

ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of

command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the

Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe. Following the

publication of the addendum to its interim report (S/2012/348/Add.1), the

Group met the Government of Rwanda and took into consideration its

written response. The Group has, however, found no substantive element

of its previous findings that it wishes to alter.

Senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided

support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese

territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning,

political advice and facilitation of external relations. Units of the

Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces

jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the

major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese armed forces base

of Rumangabo. Both Governments have also cooperated to support the

creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 and have

consistently advocated on behalf of the rebels. M23 and its allies include

six sanctioned individuals, some of whom reside in or regularly travel to

Rwanda and Uganda.

Taking advantage of a lull in combat on the official front lines,

M23 has sought to build coalitions with other armed groups throughout

the Kivus and in Ituri and Kasai Occidental. Col. Sultani Makenga

emerged as the coordinator of the armed groups allied with M23. In

August and September, he ordered Raïa Mutomboki to carry out brutal

ethnically motivated attacks, burning more than 800 homes and killing

hundreds of civilians from Congolese Hutu communities in Masisi

territory, whose militias refused to ally themselves with M23.

The use and recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups, notably

by M23, has increased. In particular, several M23 commanders with

histories of child recruitment have overseen the enrolment and training of

hundreds of young boys and girls. Furthermore, some M23 commanders

have ordered the extrajudicial executions of dozens of recruits and

prisoners of war.

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The many attempts by M23 to forge a common front with ethnic

Hema and Lendu armed groups in Ituri and the Banyamulenge

community in South Kivu have encountered significant resistance. The

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought to

counter the efforts of M23 to expand its alliances by promoting

integration processes with armed groups, notably in Ituri and in Masisi

territory.

At historically low numbers, the Forces démocratiques de libération

du Rwanda (FDLR), although continuing to commit abuses against

civilians, have become further isolated from external support and are

focused on self-protection in the face of attacks by the Congolese armed

forces and M23 allies. Junior FDLR officers have sought to ally

themselves with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo against M23, while some criminal networks within the Congolese

armed forces continue to sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels.

There is, however, no evidence of strategic cooperation between FDLR

and the Government.

Among Burundian rebel groups, the Forces nationales de libération

remain divided and reliant on local Congolese armed groups, while the

Front national pour la révolution au Burundi has now transformed itself

into the Front du peuple murundi and allied itself with M23 in South

Kivu. The Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces have expanded their

military capacity and cooperated with Al-Shabaab networks in East

Africa.

The Congolese armed forces continue to be plagued by criminal

networks generating revenue for senior officers through their control

over natural resources and contraband, including the trafficking of ivory

from armed groups. The land forces commander, Gen. Gabriel Amisi,

oversees a network distributing hunting ammunition for poachers and

armed groups, including Raïa Mutomboki. Disarmament and stockpile

management efforts have also been undermined by the increased demand

associated with the M23 rebellion as the market price for small arms has

risen fourfold.

The requirement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of

the Congo for mineral exporters to exercise due diligence in accordance

with United Nations and Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development guidelines has nearly halted all tin, tantalum and tungsten

exports from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, apart from

north Katanga where mineral tagging was introduced in 2011. Smuggling

into both Burundi and Rwanda is on the rise. The credibility of the

mineral tagging system in place in Rwanda is jeopardized by the

laundering of Congolese minerals because tags are routinely sold by

mining cooperatives. Several traders have contributed to financing M23

rebels using profits resulting from the smuggling of Congolese minerals

into Rwanda.

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While tin ore production has decreased in the Kivus, tantalum and

tungsten ore production has been resilient to international traceability

demands, given that those minerals are more easily smuggled. Rwandan

exports of tantalum and tungsten have experienced a corresponding

increase during 2012, while tin ore exports have decreased.

Overall price and production decreases have had negative

socioeconomic consequences in some mining zones. New commercial

opportunities have, however, been created as mining communities have

adapted to other economic sectors. Security has improved in most of the

major tin and tantalum mining areas, which has led to less conflict

financing and increased oversight and monitoring by civil authorities and

non-governmental organizations.

Armed groups, criminal networks within the Congolese armed

forces and miners easily shift to gold mines where due diligence

requirements have not affected trade. Nearly all gold from the eastern

Democratic Republic of the Congo is smuggled out of the country and

channelled through a few major traders in Kampala and Bujumbura who

ship out several tons per year, worth hundreds of millions of United

States dollars. In the United Arab Emirates, most Congolese gold is

smelted and sold to jewellers. The assets freeze imposed by the Security

Council has not limited the operations of the previous owner of the

sanctioned entity Machanga Ltd., who exports through other front

companies and transfers large sums of money to suppliers in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo.

S/2012/843

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I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), the Group

of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submits the present final report

in fulfilment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Security Council

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, before 19 October 2012. In its monitoring of the

arms embargo introduced by the Council in its resolution 1493 (2003), the Group’s

primary role is to investigate and document evidence regarding the procurement of

military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, by armed groups active in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as their related financial networks

and involvement in the exploitation and trade of natural resources. The Group

adheres to a rigorous investigative methodology to ensure the greatest degree of

accuracy of its assertions and conclusions. A more complete overview of its mandate

and methodology can be found in annexes 1 and 2 to the present report. A list of

entities with which the Group officially met can be found in annex 77.

2. The Group submitted an interim report to the Committee on 18 May 2012

(S/2012/348) and, on 26 June 2012, an addendum thereto concerning violations of

the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda. The Group

provided the Committee with a detailed response (see annex 3 to the present report)

to the rebuttal by the Government of Rwanda of the addendum (see annex 4 to the

present report).

II. Congolese armed groups

A. Mouvement du 23 mars

3. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, the Mouvement

du 23 mars (M23) has continued to carry out military operations and expanded the

terrain that it controls in Rutshuru territory, shifting the front line to 30 km north of

the provincial capital, Goma. Composed of some 1,250 troops, mainly former

Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) soldiers who deserted from the

Congolese armed forces, M23 faces challenges in carrying out independent

operations and controlling newly gained positions owing to troop shortages.

4. Both Rwanda and individuals within the Government of Uganda have been

supporting M23. While Rwandan officials have coordinated the creation of the rebel

movement and its major military operations, the more subtle support of Ugandan

officials has allowed the political branch of the rebel group to operate from

Kampala and boost its external relations. The limited assistance provided by officers

within the Uganda People’s Defence Forces to M23 has nevertheless been decisive

in its seizure of principal towns in Rutshuru.

5. Beginning in July 2012, a series of initiatives by the International Conference

on the Great Lakes Region were launched to resolve the conflict in the eastern

Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this context, on 16 August, the Conference

mandated the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to convey to M23 the

Conference’s conclusion that the rebels must cease all offensive activities, leave the

border and withdraw to their initial positions (see annex 5 to the present report).

Nearly two months later, however, amid continuing efforts by the Conference, M23

S/2012/843

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has further consolidated its deployments and gained additional terrain with the help

of allied armed groups and continued support from the Rwandan and Ugandan

armed forces.

1. Support provided by the Government of Rwanda to M23

6. The Government of Rwanda has continued to support M23 and other armed

groups in all categories of arms embargo violations previously documented by the

Group. Rwandan officials have provided military support to M23 through permanent

troop reinforcements and clandestine support through special forces units of the

armed forces stationed alongside the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru for joint

operations. Officers of the Rwandan armed forces have also furnished the rebels

with weapons, facilitated the evacuation of casualties to Rwanda and shared

communication equipment with M23. Recruitment for M23 has continued in

Rwandan villages, former CNDP officers have joined the rebellion through

Rwandan territory and Front patriotique rwandais (RPF) members have collected

funds for the movement. Rwandan officials created the political branch and

government of M23 and provided political advice. M23 continues to be commanded

by Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, a sanctioned individual who operates under the orders and

guidance of Rwandan officials.

7. Various Southern African Development Community, European, Ugandan and

Burundian intelligence agents also confirmed the Group’s findings concerning

Rwandan violations of the embargo.

(a) Military support provided to M23 by the Rwandan armed forces
(i) Troop support

8. Rwandan troops continue to operate within the Democratic Republic of the

Congo in support of M23. Troop shortages notwithstanding, in July 2012, M23

carried out large-scale operations and expanded the area under its control in

Rutshuru. Officers of the Congolese armed forces, former officers of the Rwandan

armed forces and current and former M23 members attested to the deployment of

additional units of the Rwandan armed forces to reinforce all major rebel operations,

as well as to the permanent deployment of Rwandan troops alongside M23 to

consolidate control over acquired terrain. Border officials and former M23 soldiers

repeatedly witnessed the arrival of Rwandan troops into the Democratic Republic of

the Congo from Kinigi, the main Rwandan armed forces base in proximity to the

Congolese border currently supporting M23 operations, and other troop

deployments close to the Congolese border (see annex 6 to the present report).

Current and former M23 soldiers observed a regular presence of Rwandan troops

around the positions taken by Gen. Ntaganda and Col. Sultani Makenga, in addition

to other M23 deployments.

9. Nine local leaders who saw Rwandan soldiers marching together with M23

members stated that the Rwandan troops could be easily identified by their distinct

uniforms, equipment, patrolling style and accent when speaking in Kinyarwanda.

During the Group’s visit to Kigali from 23 to 25 July 2012, the Minister of Defence

of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe, confirmed that Rwandan units could be easily

distinguished from M23 or other troops for all the above reasons.

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10. Two current and five demobilized Rwandan soldiers, ordered by their

commanders to join M23, confirmed the permanent presence of Rwandan forces in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 7 to the present report). They

stated that, although Rwandan units frequently rotated, soldiers of the 305th brigade

operating under the coordination of the Western Division commander,

Gen. Emmanuel Ruvusha, had supported M23 operations in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces,

Gen. Charles Kayonga, confirmed to the Group that in July 2012 the 305th brigade

had been deployed at Kinigi.

(ii) Support provided by Rwandan special forces to M23

11. Rwandan special forces deployed with the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru

have backed M23 operations. Following an agreement between the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, two special forces units from the armed forces

of both countries, including Rwandan troops commanded by Lt Col. James Casius,

have conducted joint operations along the Rwandan border since 2011 (see

S/2011/738, para. 116, and annex 8 to the present report).

12. Former and current M23 officers, in addition to senior commanders of the

Congolese armed forces, told the Group that special forces platoons clandestinely

supported M23 attacks. Five local villagers stated that Rwandan special forces held

regular meetings with M23.

1 During a mission to the area, a member of the Group

witnessed how an M23 commander communicated by radio with Rwandan troops

for reinforcements.

13. Its reluctance to remove its special forces from rebel territory notwithstanding,

the Government of Rwanda withdrew 344 soldiers on 1 September 2012. Former

officers of the Rwandan armed forces, M23 members, armed group members and

officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the

Group that some of those special forces returned immediately to the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and further operated with M23.

(iii) Treatment of casualties at the Kanombe military hospital

14. The Rwandan armed forces have evacuated casualties to Rwanda. Two former

officers, a senior member of RPF and an ex-CNDP officer informed the Group that

the rebels transported most injured Rwandan soldiers fighting alongside M23 to the

Kanombe military hospital in Kigali. The Rwandan armed forces bury the deceased

in the Kanombe military cemetery. An M23 collaborator interviewed by the Group

visited the hospital after M23 operations had been conducted in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and confirmed the presence of dozens of wounded soldiers.

(iv) Communication between M23 and the Rwandan armed forces

15. Rwandan armed forces and M23 officers have harmonized their

communication equipment in order to coordinate operations. According to former

members of the Rwandan armed forces and RPF, in addition to M23 cadres, senior

__________________

Following a small attack on its vehicles by bandits within M23 territory, the Group sought a

security escort by an M23 commander, who called with his digital radio for reinforcements. The

Group proceeded to discover that the escort was led by Rwandan special forces who had come

from Kahunga.

officers of the Rwandan armed forces and M23 communicate through digital VHF

radio systems used by the Rwandan armed forces, which those forces shared with

M23 commanders. Operational radio communications at the junior level are

conducted through commercial radio sets that M23 officers used within the

Congolese armed forces and subsequently gave to officers of the Rwandan armed

forces. Commanders of the Congolese armed forces are capable of intercepting the

latter communications. Since it submitted the addendum to its interim report, the

Group has obtained new radio intercepts of communications between commanders

of the Rwandan armed forces and M23.

(v) Clandestine operations by the Rwandan armed forces and M23

16. The Group has documented a pattern of Rwandan armed forces and M23

intelligence activities on Congolese armed forces positions around the front-line

villages of Kibumba and Tongo, defending Goma and Masisi respectively. Since

M23 initiated its operations, the Congolese authorities have captured two Rwandan

soldiers and a demobilized Rwandan soldier in Kibumba (see annex 9 to the present

report). The Group interviewed five other individuals, including two former

Rwandan soldiers, an ex-Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)

combatant who had been recruited by M23, an ex-M23 soldier and a Rwandan

civilian who had been intercepted while gathering intelligence for M23 in Tongo

(see annex 10 to the present report).

17. A series of targeted assassinations and grenade attacks took place in Goma in

the first week of October 2012. M23 commanders told the Group that they would

need to take Goma in order to secure the population. According to Government

investigators, former Rwandan armed forces officers and community leaders,

however, individuals from Gisenyi carried out the attacks with grenades routinely

used by the Rwandan armed forces, under the orders of Rwandan armed forces

officers and M23 members operating from Rwanda (see annex 11 to the present

report). Congolese armed forces logistics officers stated that such grenades were not

registered in their stocks. Following investigations into the attacks, the Congolese

police arrested several individuals operating from Gisenyi, in addition to a former

FDLR officer who the Rwandan armed forces had recruited to work within Rwandan

special forces in Rutshuru immediately after his demobilization (see annex 12 to the

present report). At the time of writing, investigations were continuing.

(vi) Arms supplies

18. The Rwandan armed forces continued to supply M23 with weapons and

ammunition. M23 officers and soldiers have witnessed deliveries every two weeks

by the Rwandan armed forces to the M23 headquarters in Runyoni since the outset

of the rebellion. Col. Makenga showed those officers the large amounts of weapons

and ammunition that the Rwandan armed forces had donated.

19. Several former M23 combatants witnessed increased deliveries of ammunition

from Rwanda before specific operations. Four former M23 soldiers described how

they had assisted in transporting boxes of ammunition from Rwandan armed forces

bases in Kinigi and Njerima in Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

__________________

The Group has placed these new radio intercepts in the United Nations archives for future

reference.

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Attacks on Bunagana and principal towns in Rutshuru

Rwandan armed forces commanders operated alongside M23 and

provided logistical support during the July 2012 operations that enabled

the capture of Bunagana, Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Rumangabo (see

annex 13 to the present report). Ugandan armed forces commanders also

supported those attacks. During the operation, the rebels killed a

peacekeeper from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in Bunagana and

fired on the MONUSCO base in Kiwanja (see annex 14 to the present

report).

M23 soldiers, Congolese armed forces officers, M23 supporters and

United Nations officials stated that, in addition to the Rwandan troops

permanently stationed with M23, the Rwandan armed forces deployed

more than 2,000 soldiers to seize Bunagana. According to several M23

soldiers, Rwandan armed forces commanders provided the rebels with

heavy weapons such as 12.7 mm machine guns and 60 mm, 91 mm and

120 mm mortars, in addition to anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers

ahead of the attack. Rwandan special forces in Rutshuru also aided the

rebels and fired 13 rounds at a Congolese armed forces combat helicopter

during the takeover of Kiwanja.

According to former M23 officers and ex-Rwandan armed forces

officers, the Rwandan troops who participated in the attack were part of

both the 305th brigade and the ninety-ninth battalion. Lt Col. Kitoko

Kadida commanded those units under the coordination of Gen. Ruvusha

and the overall command of Gen. Kayonga. According to several former

M23 officers and soldiers, Gen. Kayonga was present at the M23

headquarters in Runyoni during the operation.

Current and former M23 officers, politicians and Congolese armed

forces officers confirmed that senior Rwandan and M23 officers jointly

planned the attacks. Before these operations, Gen. Ntaganda, Col. Makenga

and Col. Baudouin Ngaruye had travelled to Rwanda to meet

Gen. Kabarebe, Gen. Nziza and Gen. Kayonga in Kinigi. The same

sources told the Group that Col. Makenga had planned further details

with Gen. Ruvusha.

Subsequent to the fighting in Rutshuru, Congolese armed forces

officers and local leaders observed some 30 casualties on the battlefield,

most of whom wore Rwandan uniforms (see annex 15 to the present

report). M23 is the only armed group in all of the eastern Democratic

Republic of the Congo that wears Rwandan armed forces uniforms. The

Congolese armed forces recovered an AK-47 that had not been registered

within Congolese armed forces stockpiles, a 60 mm mortar round with an

elongated shell that did not correspond to mortars used by the Congolese

armed forces and a Rwandan driving licence (see annexes 16, 17 and 18

to the present report, respectively).

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(b) Recruitment for M23 in Rwanda

20. Recruitment within Rwanda by the Rwandan armed forces for M23 has

increased in the past months. The main targets for recruitment are demobilized

Rwandan soldiers and civilians, in addition to Congolese refugees. The Rwandan

armed forces are continuing to forcefully recruit ex-FDLR combatants from the

Mutobo demobilization camp (see para. 157). On the basis of numbers provided by

dozens of former M23 soldiers who had escaped from M23 training camps, the

Group estimates that since its creation M23 has trained at least 800 new soldiers.

21. Since the submission of the addendum to its interim report, the Group has

interviewed an additional 48 former M23 combatants, 26 of whom are of Rwandan

nationality.

3 Since the creation of M23, more than 50 Rwandan nationals from M23

have surrendered to MONUSCO, but the Government has refused their repatriation

on the grounds that their nationality has yet to be established.

22. Before being sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most recruits

continued to transit through Gen. Ntaganda’s Hotel Bushokoro in Kinigi, Rwanda.

During its visit to Bushokoro on 21 August 2012, the Group confirmed that the

premises of the hotel, surrounded by a protection unit of the Rwandan armed forces,

corresponded to the descriptions that former M23 soldiers had provided (see

annex 19 to the present report).

23. From Kinigi, Rwandan troops escort recruits through the Virunga National

Park to Runyoni. Former M23 soldiers stated that, before reaching the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Rwandan armed forces officers had told them that they

would be fighting for Gen. Ntaganda to take control of North Kivu, confiscated their

telephones, burned their identity cards and instructed them to claim to be Congolese

in the event of capture. According to the same sources, recruits who flee to Rwanda

are brought back to M23 by Rwandan soldiers, at which point most are executed,

detained or tortured.

24. M23 members, former Rwandan armed forces officers and politicians told the

Group that Gen. Kabarebe was ultimately responsible for all M23 recruitment and

that he ordered loyal Rwandan armed forces officers to facilitate recruitment

operations within Rwanda.

25. Politicians, local leaders and former M23 soldiers informed the Group that

M23 had established four training camps and had completed a second wave of

training of separate groups of between 100 and 250 soldiers. The trainers, including

Rwandan officers, brief recruits on the failures of the Government of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo and explain their objective of liberating the

Democratic Republic of the Congo.

26. Former M23 officers and soldiers told the Group that newly trained soldiers

were immediately sent to the front lines to provide cover for M23 units. Owing to

their lack of experience, almost half of the then new inductees were killed during

combat operations in Bunagana, Rutshuru and Rumangabo in July 2012.

__________________

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3
The Group has now interviewed a total of 52 Rwandan nationals who have deserted from M23.

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(c) Facilitation by the Rwandan armed forces of desertions to M23

27. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, former CNDP

officers and troops have continued to join M23. Several former CNDP officers and

current Congolese armed forces officers said that Gen. Kabarebe or his assistant,

Capt. Celestin Senkoko, had ordered them to desert. According to current and

former M23 combatants and immigration officials, most officers who joined M23

did so using Rwandan territory. They stated that the deserters usually crossed the

border at Goma and travelled to Ruhengeri, where Rwandan troops escorted them

through the Virunga National Park to Runyoni.

(d) Support for M23 political activities

28. Rwandan officials nominated the political leadership and government of M23.

According to former Rwandan armed forces officers, M23 supporters and

politicians, at the beginning of July 2012, Gen. Kabarebe imposed Jean-Marie

Runiga Lugerero, a bishop, as the political coordinator of M23 (see annex 20 to the

present report). Mr. Runiga, the former CNDP party representative in Kinshasa,

travelled to Kigali before taking up his new post with the rebels. The same sources

stated that Gen. Kabarebe had also unilaterally appointed the members of the M23

government named on 17 August 2012 (see annex 21 to the present report). During a

visit by the Group to Bunagana on the day of the declaration, several M23 members

were unaware that they had been nominated to a cabinet position.

29. According to M23 members, collaborators and politicians, while regional

initiatives by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to resolve the

conflict began in August 2012, Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza advised the rebels on

how to update former CNDP demands to the current political context.

(e) M23 fundraising in Rwanda

30. RPF members have been recruiting sympathizers and raising funds for M23

from within Rwanda. Politicians, former Rwandan armed forces and CNDP officers

told the Group that Rwigamba Balinda, a Rwandan senator and Rector of the Free

University of Kigali, and John Rucyahana, a bishop (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 29),

both RPF members, had overseen those activities in Rwanda and abroad. The same

sources informed the Group that senior Rwandan armed forces officers and RPF

officials diverted a portion of the financial contributions collected on behalf of M23

for their own benefit.

(f) M23 chain of command in Kigali

31. Former M23 officers and soldiers stated that Gen. Ntaganda continued to serve

as the highest commander of the rebels on the ground, while Col. Makenga was

responsible for operations and coordination with allied armed groups. Rwandan

armed forces officers and current and former M23 members also stated that the

former CNDP leader, Gen. Laurent Nkunda,

5 a sanctioned individual, provided

advice to M23 commanders and recruited for M23 in Rwanda.

__________________

Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza instructed M23 to return to the demands that it made during the

peace process with the Government in 2008 and to add further elements that related to

governance and development.

Laurent Nkunda was designated for sanctions in 2007 while he was the leader of CNDP. See

S/2012/348/Add.1, paras. 27, 31 and 34.

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32. Rwandan officials exercise overall command and strategic planning for M23.

Politicians, current and former M23 members, Congolese armed forces officers and

former Rwandan armed forces officers all confirmed that Gen. Ntaganda and

Col. Makenga received direct military orders from the Chief of Staff of the

Rwandan armed forces, Gen. Kayonga, who in turn acted on instructions from the

Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. Kabarebe (see annex 22 to the present report).

The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Gen. Jacques Nziza, provides

strategic advice and oversees the provision of logistical support to M23.

Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza have also played an instrumental role in sustaining

the political activities of M23. According to former Rwandan armed forces officers,

current M23 members and former M23 officers, Gen. Ruvusha manages the

provision of military ground support to M23.

33. Several current and former M23 officers also stated that senior Rwandan

officials travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold meetings with

M23 commanders. Gen. Kayonga has been at least three times to Runyoni to plan

operations and reassure the rebels of the full support of the Government of Rwanda.

(g) Support for sanctioned individuals

34. Gen. Ntaganda continues to be based near Runyoni (see annex 23 to the

present report), just a few kilometres away from the Rwandan border, and regularly

travels to Rwanda, violating the travel ban. M23 officers loyal to Gen. Nkunda

stated that they agreed to operate with Rwandan support only after reassurances

from senior officials of the Government of Rwanda that the former CNDP leader

would be freed and allowed to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. M23

officers said that, in violation of his travel ban, Gen. Nkunda had visited M23 in

Runyoni to encourage his officers.

2. Support provided by the Government of Uganda to M23

35. While lower in intensity than the involvement of the Government of Rwanda,

networks within the Government of Uganda have also supported M23 by facilitating

the political and military activities of M23 members while permanently present in

Kampala and by providing technical assistance, political advice and military

support. Ugandan armed forces commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce

specific M23 operations and assisted in M23 recruitment and weapons procurement

efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a laissez-faire policy, by

which local military and civil authorities were authorized to cooperate with M23

because of their personal ties to the Rwandan armed forces or the rebels. Senior

Ugandan armed forces commanders have also cooperated with Gen. Ntaganda and

allowed him to visit and acquire a residence in Kampala, in violation of the travel

ban and assets freeze. In an official communication with the Committee, lawyers

hired by the Government of Rwanda have also cited support for M23 from Ugandan

territory (see annex 24 to the present report).

(a) Military support provided by the Ugandan armed forces to M23
(i) Troop support

36. Members of the Ugandan armed forces have actively supported M23 in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, alongside their Rwandan counterparts. During

its field missions to Rutshuru, the Group confirmed this with three Ugandan

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intelligence officers, three Kampala-based diplomats and Ugandan and Congolese

authorities and community leaders.

37. Three officials of the Government of Uganda, a Ugandan local leader and M23

cadres told the Group that, in July, the Ugandan armed forces had assembled troops

from the Western Division headquarters in Mbarara and from Kisoro and sent them

to the Democratic Republic of the Congo using deployments near the border. To

facilitate Ugandan troop support, M23 placed agents at the Bunagana and Kitagoma

border posts. During its visit to Kitagoma in August 2012, the Group observed M23

controls on the Congolese side and no officials present on the Ugandan side (see

annex 25 to the present report).

38. Local Congolese armed forces commanders and current and former M23

officers informed the Group that, in July 2012, the Ugandan armed forces had

deployed a unit of some 600 soldiers of the Ugandan armed forces were present in

Busanza, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to prepare the rebel attacks in

Rutshuru territory. These same sources stated that the Ugandan soldiers had

reinforced Rwandan troops already present and formed what they termed a “mixed

brigade”, which outnumbered the M23 troops. During that period, a former M23

soldier overheard a conversation between Ugandan armed forces and M23

commanders, using a commercial radio, during which they discussed the need to

“decentralize the Kivus”. The Group obtained a copy of radio intercepts in which

Ugandan officers communicated with Rwandan and M23 officers during joint

military operations, speaking with a Swahili accent described by several interpreters

as being commonly used within the Ugandan military in addition to using some

expressions in Kiganda (see annex 26 to the present report).

39. Former M23 soldiers, local authorities and villagers were able to easily

distinguish the Ugandan troops because they wore Ugandan armed forces uniforms

and had distinct boots and military equipment. While the Ugandan troops spoke in

English, Kiganda, Kinyankole or Swahili, Rwandan troops spoke in Kinyarwanda

and M23 troops in a mix of Kinyarwanda and Swahili.

40. M23 cadres said that Ugandan armed forces officers introduced themselves as

Ugandans. A local leader told the Group that a Ugandan armed forces officer had

addressed the population in Kifumbira, a language spoken in south-western

Uganda.

8 Medical personnel stated that another Ugandan armed forces officer

unable to speak the local languages requested medicines from Rutshuru hospital in

English.

41. The Group interviewed a Ugandan soldier arrested in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo. He said that, after completing military training in Masaka, Uganda,

his commanders had sent him to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

alongside three groups of 75 experienced Ugandan soldiers and other trainees. Two

former M23 soldiers who fought together with the Ugandan armed forces stated that

some of those soldiers were experienced, while the others had recently completed

basic training. The Group twice interviewed another Ugandan national captured by

__________________

The Government of Uganda informed the Group in writing that M23 had a military position at

Kitagoma.

The Group has placed these tapes in the United Nations archives.

Kifumbira is a language that is very similar to Kinyarwanda and is spoken in Rwanda and the

eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru territory, who refused to reveal more than

his name and Ugandan armed forces membership.

42. Following the large-scale operations in July 2012, a border official, two

Congolese local leaders residing in Uganda and former M23 soldiers told the Group

that the Ugandan armed forces and M23 had evacuated casualties to Uganda and

transported them to the military hospital in Mbarara. The Group interviewed a

former M23 officer and a civilian who had been tasked with evacuating the dead and

injured across the border with a Ugandan armed forces escort.

(ii) Arms supplies

43. M23 has procured weapons and ammunition from Ugandan armed forces

commanders. Col. Makenga had already begun purchasing weapons from support

networks in Uganda before his desertion from the Congolese armed forces (see

annex 27 to the present report). The Group gathered many accounts of weapons

deliveries to M23 from within Uganda, in particular ahead of attacks in Rutshuru,

including the following:

(a) Former M23 soldiers stated that Ugandan armed forces officers based in

Kisoro had been supplying M23 with small quantities of weapons. One said that he

had accompanied Col. Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of

July 2012 and witnessed how Col. Makenga had procured weapons from Ugandan

armed forces officers. On each occasion they had returned with 12.7 mm machine

guns that they had received free of charge;

(b) A former M23 soldier stated that Ugandan armed forces commanders had

brought heavy weapons, including 12.7 mm machine guns, to the hill overlooking

Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the

attack and subsequently left them with the rebels after they had taken the town.

10 A

former M23 officer told the Group that during the attack he had received several

boxes of AK-47 and submachine gun ammunition from Ugandan soldiers stationed

on the same hill;

officers, an M23 cadre and a former M23 soldier stated that two trucks had

transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana before the attacks on Rutshuru

and Kiwanja. According to a Congolese armed forces officer, the two trucks mainly

contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machine guns;

(d) Two M23 cadres and a Kampala-based businessman told the Group that

Ugandan armed forces officers had met M23 representatives near the site of the

arms production plant at the Nakasongola military base

11 to discuss weapons stored

there. Ugandan armed forces officers had subsequently delivered the weapons and

ammunition, including mortars, to M23 in Bunagana, around 19 September 2012.

An M23 cadre, a Ugandan border official and an ex-Rwandan armed forces officer

stated that a truck had offloaded weapons in Bunagana during that same week.

__________________

The Ugandan national has also refused to state anything to the Congolese officers overseeing his

detention for more than two months.

These heavy weapons remained on the Ugandan side of the border until the rebels had dislodged

MONUSCO and the Congolese armed forces from Bunaganga, at which point Ugandan soldiers

provided them to M23.

The plant is operated by Luwero Industries.

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Attacks on principal towns in Rutshuru territory

M23, Rwandan and Ugandan troops operated together during the

July 2012 takeover of Rutshuru. Former Rwandan armed forces officers,

border officials, Congolese armed forces officers and former M23

soldiers stated that, during the night of 5 and 6 July 2012, while M23 and

Rwandan troops were engaged in combat in Bunagana, Ugandan troops

had shelled the border town from their deployment on the hill

overlooking the town and sent a unit of between 100 and 150 soldiers to

fight alongside M23 and Rwandan troops. MONUSCO peacekeepers

confirmed that the Congolese armed forces had been fired upon from

Uganda.

The Group interviewed separately 15 eyewitnesses to the events,

including Congolese and Ugandan border agents, Congolese armed

forces officers based at the border, villagers, refugees, a former Ugandan

armed forces soldier and M23 soldiers, who all observed Ugandan troops

crossing into Bunagana in the middle of the attack by the Rwandan

armed forces and M23.

Additional Ugandan troops crossed into the Democratic Republic

of the Congo through three distinct locations during the two days prior to

the 24 and 25 July 2012 operations against Rutshuru and Kiwanja. Four

local leaders, two Ugandan officials, Congolese refugees in Uganda and

former M23 soldiers witnessed four trucks crossing into the Democratic

Republic of the Congo through Kitagoma to Busanza. Four other trucks

entered through Bunagana and transported Ugandan troops and weapons

to the front lines in Rutshuru town and Kalengera. Congolese armed

forces and M23 soldiers estimate that these trucks transported some 300

additional Ugandan troops.

First-hand witnesses from Busanza told the Group that the

Ugandan, Rwandan and M23 troops had forced some 30 young men to

transport ammunition to Rutshuru and Kiwanja and then to evacuate

the

dead and injured on the way back to Kabira. The Group interviewed two

civilians among the 30. Congolese armed forces officers, former M23

officers and local leaders saw the bodies of Ugandan soldiers after the

battle.

Subsequent to the attack, the Congolese armed forces recovered

several ammunition cartridges normally used by their Ugandan

counterparts (see annex 28 to the present report).

(b) Recruitment for M23 in Uganda

44. M23 cadres have been recruiting in Uganda with the support of the Ugandan

authorities. Ugandan officials, a Ugandan border agent, a Ugandan community

leader, current M23 members and collaborators, former M23 soldiers, former

Rwandan armed forces officers, former CNDP officers, armed group members based

in Kampala and a diplomatic source told the Group that those activities were

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continuing in Mbarara, Kasese, Kampala and Kisoro, as well as in the refugee

camps of Kisoro and Nyakivale.

45. Four Ugandan officials, a Congolese armed forces officer based in Bunagana,

border agents and a former CNDP member told the Group that the Jomba locality

chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambu

Socio Economic Network

Wednesday, July 31, 2013