Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report


Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report




Good People,
This Report carries with it some credible information Both Kikwete and Kabila
need to have in their possession; and as well proceed to ICC Hague without
wasting any more time........so, Kabila should face Pay-Back time and return
plus compensate what he stole from Congo.
Some situations are best handled before legal justice for reparation.
Judy Miriga
Diaspora Spokesperson &
Executive Director for
Confederation Council Foundation for Africa
USA
email: jbatec@yahoo.com
 
 
 
 

Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report


M23 Chief Executioner, Colonel Sultani Makenga marketing his trade

Rwandan Defense Forces, under the cover of Congolese rebels known as M23, have started their 2,000-mile long march to the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kinshasa.
According to our sources within Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), the order to march on Kinshasa was given on June 30, 2012 in a final meeting between General Paul Kagame of Rwanda, ex-CNDP Commander General Laurent Nkunda and Rwandan top military leaders, including Defense Minister General James Kabarebe, Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga, and General Paul Kagame’s intelligence and security adviser, General Jack Nziza. The march started on July 1, 2012 when the last unit of close to 3,000 Rwandan troops crossed the border into the DRC on the night of June 30th to reinforce 2,000 troops already supporting M23.
m23 Cadre waiting for orders from Rwanda

There’s enough evidence by the Group of Experts Interim report on the Democratic Republic of Congo,
that proves how Rwanda and its Prodigal Son, Bosco Ntaganda aka The Terminator are ploting a new frenzy of criminality in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Throughout the Group’s investigations, it has systematically gathered testimonies from former M23 combatants, M23 collaborators, ex-RDF officers, Congolese intelligence, FARDC commanders, and politicians which affirm the direct involvement in the support to M23 from senior levels of the Rwandan government.
a)General Jacques Nziza, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, supervises all military, financial, and logistic support as well as mobilization activities related to M23. He has recently been deployed to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to coordinate M23 assistance and recruitment.
b)General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan Minister of Defense, with the support of his personal secretary Captain Celestin Senkoko, also is a central figure in recruitment and mobilizing political and military support to M23. Kabarebe has often been in direct contact with M23 members on the ground to coordinate military activities.
c)General Charles Kayonga, the RDF Chief of Staff manages the overall military support to M23. Kayonga is frequently in communication with Makenga and oversaw the transfer of Makenga’s troops and weapons through Rwanda.

Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report


Criminal Paul Kagame and Bosco Ntaganda’s Crew

d) The military support on the ground has been channeled by General Emmanuel Ruvusha, RDF Division commander based in Gisenyi, as well as General Alexi Kagame, RDF Division commander based at Ruhengeri. Both facilitate recruitment of civilians and demobilized soldiers to M23 as well as coordinating RDF reinforcements in Runyoni with M23 commanders.
e)Colonel Jomba Gakumba, a native of North Kivu, who used to be an RDF instructor at the Rwandan Military Academy at Gako, was redeployed to Ruhengeri since the creation of M23, where he has been in charge of commanding locally military operations in support of M23.

M23 is using Rwandan territory and benefiting
directly from Rwanda Defence Forces facilitation



READ FULL UN REPORT OF EXPERTS

Security Council


Distr.: General
15 November 2012
Original: English
12-59339 (E) 201112
*1259339*
Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the
Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in
accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), I have the
honour to submit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).
In this connection, I would appreciate if the present letter, together with its
annex, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(

Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev
Chair

S/2012/843
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12-59339
Annex
Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group of Experts
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the
Chair of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in
pursuance of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011).
(

Signed) Steven Hege
(

Signed) Nelson Alusala
(

Signed) Ruben de Koning
(

Signed) Marie Plamadiala
(

Signed) Emilie Serralta
(Signed) Steven Spittaels


Executive summary
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains plagued by
dozens of foreign and national armed groups. Instability has increased
since the mutiny by former members of the Congrès national pour la
défense du peuple and the subsequent creation of the Mouvement du
23 mars (M23) earlier in 2012. The rebels expanded their control over
Rutshuru territory with extensive foreign support in July 2012 and have
recently taken advantage of an informal ceasefire to enhance alliances
and command proxy operations elsewhere.
The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo
by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating
recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed
forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms,
ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of
command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the
Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe. Following the
publication of the addendum to its interim report (S/2012/348/Add.1), the
Group met the Government of Rwanda and took into consideration its
written response. The Group has, however, found no substantive element
of its previous findings that it wishes to alter.
Senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided
support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese
territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning,
political advice and facilitation of external relations. Units of the
Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces
jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the
major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese armed forces base
of Rumangabo. Both Governments have also cooperated to support the
creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 and have
consistently advocated on behalf of the rebels. M23 and its allies include
six sanctioned individuals, some of whom reside in or regularly travel to
Rwanda and Uganda.
Taking advantage of a lull in combat on the official front lines,
M23 has sought to build coalitions with other armed groups throughout
the Kivus and in Ituri and Kasai Occidental. Col. Sultani Makenga
emerged as the coordinator of the armed groups allied with M23. In
August and September, he ordered Raïa Mutomboki to carry out brutal
ethnically motivated attacks, burning more than 800 homes and killing
hundreds of civilians from Congolese Hutu communities in Masisi
territory, whose militias refused to ally themselves with M23.
The use and recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups, notably
by M23, has increased. In particular, several M23 commanders with
histories of child recruitment have overseen the enrolment and training of
hundreds of young boys and girls. Furthermore, some M23 commanders
have ordered the extrajudicial executions of dozens of recruits and
prisoners of war.
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The many attempts by M23 to forge a common front with ethnic
Hema and Lendu armed groups in Ituri and the Banyamulenge
community in South Kivu have encountered significant resistance. The
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought to
counter the efforts of M23 to expand its alliances by promoting
integration processes with armed groups, notably in Ituri and in Masisi
territory.
At historically low numbers, the Forces démocratiques de libération
du Rwanda (FDLR), although continuing to commit abuses against
civilians, have become further isolated from external support and are
focused on self-protection in the face of attacks by the Congolese armed
forces and M23 allies. Junior FDLR officers have sought to ally
themselves with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo against M23, while some criminal networks within the Congolese
armed forces continue to sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels.
There is, however, no evidence of strategic cooperation between FDLR
and the Government.
Among Burundian rebel groups, the Forces nationales de libération
remain divided and reliant on local Congolese armed groups, while the
Front national pour la révolution au Burundi has now transformed itself
into the Front du peuple murundi and allied itself with M23 in South
Kivu. The Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces have expanded their
military capacity and cooperated with Al-Shabaab networks in East
Africa.
The Congolese armed forces continue to be plagued by criminal
networks generating revenue for senior officers through their control
over natural resources and contraband, including the trafficking of ivory
from armed groups. The land forces commander, Gen. Gabriel Amisi,
oversees a network distributing hunting ammunition for poachers and
armed groups, including Raïa Mutomboki. Disarmament and stockpile
management efforts have also been undermined by the increased demand
associated with the M23 rebellion as the market price for small arms has
risen fourfold.
The requirement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for mineral exporters to exercise due diligence in accordance
with United Nations and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development guidelines has nearly halted all tin, tantalum and tungsten
exports from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, apart from
north Katanga where mineral tagging was introduced in 2011. Smuggling
into both Burundi and Rwanda is on the rise. The credibility of the
mineral tagging system in place in Rwanda is jeopardized by the
laundering of Congolese minerals because tags are routinely sold by
mining cooperatives. Several traders have contributed to financing M23
rebels using profits resulting from the smuggling of Congolese minerals
into Rwanda.
S/2012/843
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5
While tin ore production has decreased in the Kivus, tantalum and
tungsten ore production has been resilient to international traceability
demands, given that those minerals are more easily smuggled. Rwandan
exports of tantalum and tungsten have experienced a corresponding
increase during 2012, while tin ore exports have decreased.
Overall price and production decreases have had negative
socioeconomic consequences in some mining zones. New commercial
opportunities have, however, been created as mining communities have
adapted to other economic sectors. Security has improved in most of the
major tin and tantalum mining areas, which has led to less conflict
financing and increased oversight and monitoring by civil authorities and
non-governmental organizations.
Armed groups, criminal networks within the Congolese armed
forces and miners easily shift to gold mines where due diligence
requirements have not affected trade. Nearly all gold from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is smuggled out of the country and
channelled through a few major traders in Kampala and Bujumbura who
ship out several tons per year, worth hundreds of millions of United
States dollars. In the United Arab Emirates, most Congolese gold is
smelted and sold to jewellers. The assets freeze imposed by the Security
Council has not limited the operations of the previous owner of the
sanctioned entity Machanga Ltd., who exports through other front
companies and transfers large sums of money to suppliers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
S/2012/843
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I. Introduction
1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), the Group
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submits the present final report
in fulfilment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, before 19 October 2012. In its monitoring of the
arms embargo introduced by the Council in its resolution 1493 (2003), the Group’s
primary role is to investigate and document evidence regarding the procurement of
military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, by armed groups active in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as their related financial networks
and involvement in the exploitation and trade of natural resources. The Group
adheres to a rigorous investigative methodology to ensure the greatest degree of
accuracy of its assertions and conclusions. A more complete overview of its mandate
and methodology can be found in annexes 1 and 2 to the present report. A list of
entities with which the Group officially met can be found in annex 77.
2. The Group submitted an interim report to the Committee on 18 May 2012
(S/2012/348) and, on 26 June 2012, an addendum thereto concerning violations of
the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda. The Group
provided the Committee with a detailed response (see annex 3 to the present report)
to the rebuttal by the Government of Rwanda of the addendum (see annex 4 to the
present report).
II. Congolese armed groups
A. Mouvement du 23 mars
3. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, the Mouvement
du 23 mars (M23) has continued to carry out military operations and expanded the
terrain that it controls in Rutshuru territory, shifting the front line to 30 km north of
the provincial capital, Goma. Composed of some 1,250 troops, mainly former
Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) soldiers who deserted from the
Congolese armed forces, M23 faces challenges in carrying out independent
operations and controlling newly gained positions owing to troop shortages.
4. Both Rwanda and individuals within the Government of Uganda have been
supporting M23. While Rwandan officials have coordinated the creation of the rebel
movement and its major military operations, the more subtle support of Ugandan
officials has allowed the political branch of the rebel group to operate from
Kampala and boost its external relations. The limited assistance provided by officers
within the Uganda People’s Defence Forces to M23 has nevertheless been decisive
in its seizure of principal towns in Rutshuru.
5. Beginning in July 2012, a series of initiatives by the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region were launched to resolve the conflict in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this context, on 16 August, the Conference
mandated the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to convey to M23 the
Conference’s conclusion that the rebels must cease all offensive activities, leave the
border and withdraw to their initial positions (see annex 5 to the present report).
Nearly two months later, however, amid continuing efforts by the Conference, M23
S/2012/843
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7
has further consolidated its deployments and gained additional terrain with the help
of allied armed groups and continued support from the Rwandan and Ugandan
armed forces.
1. Support provided by the Government of Rwanda to M23
6. The Government of Rwanda has continued to support M23 and other armed
groups in all categories of arms embargo violations previously documented by the
Group. Rwandan officials have provided military support to M23 through permanent
troop reinforcements and clandestine support through special forces units of the
armed forces stationed alongside the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru for joint
operations. Officers of the Rwandan armed forces have also furnished the rebels
with weapons, facilitated the evacuation of casualties to Rwanda and shared
communication equipment with M23. Recruitment for M23 has continued in
Rwandan villages, former CNDP officers have joined the rebellion through
Rwandan territory and Front patriotique rwandais (RPF) members have collected
funds for the movement. Rwandan officials created the political branch and
government of M23 and provided political advice. M23 continues to be commanded
by Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, a sanctioned individual who operates under the orders and
guidance of Rwandan officials.
7. Various Southern African Development Community, European, Ugandan and
Burundian intelligence agents also confirmed the Group’s findings concerning
Rwandan violations of the embargo.
(a) Military support provided to M23 by the Rwandan armed forces
(i) Troop support
8. Rwandan troops continue to operate within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in support of M23. Troop shortages notwithstanding, in July 2012, M23
carried out large-scale operations and expanded the area under its control in
Rutshuru. Officers of the Congolese armed forces, former officers of the Rwandan
armed forces and current and former M23 members attested to the deployment of
additional units of the Rwandan armed forces to reinforce all major rebel operations,
as well as to the permanent deployment of Rwandan troops alongside M23 to
consolidate control over acquired terrain. Border officials and former M23 soldiers
repeatedly witnessed the arrival of Rwandan troops into the Democratic Republic of
the Congo from Kinigi, the main Rwandan armed forces base in proximity to the
Congolese border currently supporting M23 operations, and other troop
deployments close to the Congolese border (see annex 6 to the present report).
Current and former M23 soldiers observed a regular presence of Rwandan troops
around the positions taken by Gen. Ntaganda and Col. Sultani Makenga, in addition
to other M23 deployments.
9. Nine local leaders who saw Rwandan soldiers marching together with M23
members stated that the Rwandan troops could be easily identified by their distinct
uniforms, equipment, patrolling style and accent when speaking in Kinyarwanda.
During the Group’s visit to Kigali from 23 to 25 July 2012, the Minister of Defence
of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe, confirmed that Rwandan units could be easily
distinguished from M23 or other troops for all the above reasons.
S/2012/843
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12-59339
10. Two current and five demobilized Rwandan soldiers, ordered by their
commanders to join M23, confirmed the permanent presence of Rwandan forces in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 7 to the present report). They
stated that, although Rwandan units frequently rotated, soldiers of the 305th brigade
operating under the coordination of the Western Division commander,
Gen. Emmanuel Ruvusha, had supported M23 operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces,
Gen. Charles Kayonga, confirmed to the Group that in July 2012 the 305th brigade
had been deployed at Kinigi.
(ii) Support provided by Rwandan special forces to M23
11. Rwandan special forces deployed with the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru
have backed M23 operations. Following an agreement between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, two special forces units from the armed forces
of both countries, including Rwandan troops commanded by Lt Col. James Casius,
have conducted joint operations along the Rwandan border since 2011 (see
S/2011/738, para. 116, and annex 8 to the present report).
12. Former and current M23 officers, in addition to senior commanders of the
Congolese armed forces, told the Group that special forces platoons clandestinely
supported M23 attacks. Five local villagers stated that Rwandan special forces held
regular meetings with M23.

1 During a mission to the area, a member of the Group
witnessed how an M23 commander communicated by radio with Rwandan troops
for reinforcements.
13. Its reluctance to remove its special forces from rebel territory notwithstanding,
the Government of Rwanda withdrew 344 soldiers on 1 September 2012. Former
officers of the Rwandan armed forces, M23 members, armed group members and
officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the
Group that some of those special forces returned immediately to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and further operated with M23.
(iii) Treatment of casualties at the Kanombe military hospital
14. The Rwandan armed forces have evacuated casualties to Rwanda. Two former
officers, a senior member of RPF and an ex-CNDP officer informed the Group that
the rebels transported most injured Rwandan soldiers fighting alongside M23 to the
Kanombe military hospital in Kigali. The Rwandan armed forces bury the deceased
in the Kanombe military cemetery. An M23 collaborator interviewed by the Group
visited the hospital after M23 operations had been conducted in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and confirmed the presence of dozens of wounded soldiers.
(iv) Communication between M23 and the Rwandan armed forces
15. Rwandan armed forces and M23 officers have harmonized their
communication equipment in order to coordinate operations. According to former
members of the Rwandan armed forces and RPF, in addition to M23 cadres, senior
__________________
1

Following a small attack on its vehicles by bandits within M23 territory, the Group sought a
security escort by an M23 commander, who called with his digital radio for reinforcements. The
Group proceeded to discover that the escort was led by Rwandan special forces who had come
from Kahunga.


officers of the Rwandan armed forces and M23 communicate through digital VHF
radio systems used by the Rwandan armed forces, which those forces shared with
M23 commanders. Operational radio communications at the junior level are
conducted through commercial radio sets that M23 officers used within the
Congolese armed forces and subsequently gave to officers of the Rwandan armed
forces. Commanders of the Congolese armed forces are capable of intercepting the
latter communications. Since it submitted the addendum to its interim report, the
Group has obtained new radio intercepts of communications between commanders
of the Rwandan armed forces and M23.

2
(v) Clandestine operations by the Rwandan armed forces and M23
16. The Group has documented a pattern of Rwandan armed forces and M23
intelligence activities on Congolese armed forces positions around the front-line
villages of Kibumba and Tongo, defending Goma and Masisi respectively. Since
M23 initiated its operations, the Congolese authorities have captured two Rwandan
soldiers and a demobilized Rwandan soldier in Kibumba (see annex 9 to the present
report). The Group interviewed five other individuals, including two former
Rwandan soldiers, an ex-Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)
combatant who had been recruited by M23, an ex-M23 soldier and a Rwandan
civilian who had been intercepted while gathering intelligence for M23 in Tongo
(see annex 10 to the present report).
17. A series of targeted assassinations and grenade attacks took place in Goma in
the first week of October 2012. M23 commanders told the Group that they would
need to take Goma in order to secure the population. According to Government
investigators, former Rwandan armed forces officers and community leaders,
however, individuals from Gisenyi carried out the attacks with grenades routinely
used by the Rwandan armed forces, under the orders of Rwandan armed forces
officers and M23 members operating from Rwanda (see annex 11 to the present
report). Congolese armed forces logistics officers stated that such grenades were not
registered in their stocks. Following investigations into the attacks, the Congolese
police arrested several individuals operating from Gisenyi, in addition to a former
FDLR officer who the Rwandan armed forces had recruited to work within Rwandan
special forces in Rutshuru immediately after his demobilization (see annex 12 to the
present report). At the time of writing, investigations were continuing.
(vi) Arms supplies
18. The Rwandan armed forces continued to supply M23 with weapons and
ammunition. M23 officers and soldiers have witnessed deliveries every two weeks
by the Rwandan armed forces to the M23 headquarters in Runyoni since the outset
of the rebellion. Col. Makenga showed those officers the large amounts of weapons
and ammunition that the Rwandan armed forces had donated.
19. Several former M23 combatants witnessed increased deliveries of ammunition
from Rwanda before specific operations. Four former M23 soldiers described how
they had assisted in transporting boxes of ammunition from Rwandan armed forces
bases in Kinigi and Njerima in Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
__________________
2

The Group has placed these new radio intercepts in the United Nations archives for future
reference.
S/2012/843
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Attacks on Bunagana and principal towns in Rutshuru
Rwandan armed forces commanders operated alongside M23 and
provided logistical support during the July 2012 operations that enabled
the capture of Bunagana, Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Rumangabo (see
annex 13 to the present report). Ugandan armed forces commanders also
supported those attacks. During the operation, the rebels killed a
peacekeeper from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in Bunagana and
fired on the MONUSCO base in Kiwanja (see annex 14 to the present
report).
M23 soldiers, Congolese armed forces officers, M23 supporters and
United Nations officials stated that, in addition to the Rwandan troops
permanently stationed with M23, the Rwandan armed forces deployed
more than 2,000 soldiers to seize Bunagana. According to several M23
soldiers, Rwandan armed forces commanders provided the rebels with
heavy weapons such as 12.7 mm machine guns and 60 mm, 91 mm and
120 mm mortars, in addition to anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers
ahead of the attack. Rwandan special forces in Rutshuru also aided the
rebels and fired 13 rounds at a Congolese armed forces combat helicopter
during the takeover of Kiwanja.
According to former M23 officers and ex-Rwandan armed forces
officers, the Rwandan troops who participated in the attack were part of
both the 305th brigade and the ninety-ninth battalion. Lt Col. Kitoko
Kadida commanded those units under the coordination of Gen. Ruvusha
and the overall command of Gen. Kayonga. According to several former
M23 officers and soldiers, Gen. Kayonga was present at the M23
headquarters in Runyoni during the operation.
Current and former M23 officers, politicians and Congolese armed
forces officers confirmed that senior Rwandan and M23 officers jointly
planned the attacks. Before these operations, Gen. Ntaganda, Col. Makenga
and Col. Baudouin Ngaruye had travelled to Rwanda to meet
Gen. Kabarebe, Gen. Nziza and Gen. Kayonga in Kinigi. The same
sources told the Group that Col. Makenga had planned further details
with Gen. Ruvusha.
Subsequent to the fighting in Rutshuru, Congolese armed forces
officers and local leaders observed some 30 casualties on the battlefield,
most of whom wore Rwandan uniforms (see annex 15 to the present
report). M23 is the only armed group in all of the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo that wears Rwandan armed forces uniforms. The
Congolese armed forces recovered an AK-47 that had not been registered
within Congolese armed forces stockpiles, a 60 mm mortar round with an
elongated shell that did not correspond to mortars used by the Congolese
armed forces and a Rwandan driving licence (see annexes 16, 17 and 18
to the present report, respectively).
S/2012/843
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11
(b) Recruitment for M23 in Rwanda
20. Recruitment within Rwanda by the Rwandan armed forces for M23 has
increased in the past months. The main targets for recruitment are demobilized
Rwandan soldiers and civilians, in addition to Congolese refugees. The Rwandan
armed forces are continuing to forcefully recruit ex-FDLR combatants from the
Mutobo demobilization camp (see para. 157). On the basis of numbers provided by
dozens of former M23 soldiers who had escaped from M23 training camps, the
Group estimates that since its creation M23 has trained at least 800 new soldiers.
21. Since the submission of the addendum to its interim report, the Group has
interviewed an additional 48 former M23 combatants, 26 of whom are of Rwandan
nationality.

3 Since the creation of M23, more than 50 Rwandan nationals from M23
have surrendered to MONUSCO, but the Government has refused their repatriation
on the grounds that their nationality has yet to be established.
22. Before being sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most recruits
continued to transit through Gen. Ntaganda’s Hotel Bushokoro in Kinigi, Rwanda.
During its visit to Bushokoro on 21 August 2012, the Group confirmed that the
premises of the hotel, surrounded by a protection unit of the Rwandan armed forces,
corresponded to the descriptions that former M23 soldiers had provided (see
annex 19 to the present report).
23. From Kinigi, Rwandan troops escort recruits through the Virunga National
Park to Runyoni. Former M23 soldiers stated that, before reaching the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwandan armed forces officers had told them that they
would be fighting for Gen. Ntaganda to take control of North Kivu, confiscated their
telephones, burned their identity cards and instructed them to claim to be Congolese
in the event of capture. According to the same sources, recruits who flee to Rwanda
are brought back to M23 by Rwandan soldiers, at which point most are executed,
detained or tortured.
24. M23 members, former Rwandan armed forces officers and politicians told the
Group that Gen. Kabarebe was ultimately responsible for all M23 recruitment and
that he ordered loyal Rwandan armed forces officers to facilitate recruitment
operations within Rwanda.
25. Politicians, local leaders and former M23 soldiers informed the Group that
M23 had established four training camps and had completed a second wave of
training of separate groups of between 100 and 250 soldiers. The trainers, including
Rwandan officers, brief recruits on the failures of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and explain their objective of liberating the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
26. Former M23 officers and soldiers told the Group that newly trained soldiers
were immediately sent to the front lines to provide cover for M23 units. Owing to
their lack of experience, almost half of the then new inductees were killed during
combat operations in Bunagana, Rutshuru and Rumangabo in July 2012.
__________________

12-59339
3
The Group has now interviewed a total of 52 Rwandan nationals who have deserted from M23.

11

S/2012/843
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(c) Facilitation by the Rwandan armed forces of desertions to M23
27. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, former CNDP
officers and troops have continued to join M23. Several former CNDP officers and
current Congolese armed forces officers said that Gen. Kabarebe or his assistant,
Capt. Celestin Senkoko, had ordered them to desert. According to current and
former M23 combatants and immigration officials, most officers who joined M23
did so using Rwandan territory. They stated that the deserters usually crossed the
border at Goma and travelled to Ruhengeri, where Rwandan troops escorted them
through the Virunga National Park to Runyoni.
(d) Support for M23 political activities
28. Rwandan officials nominated the political leadership and government of M23.
According to former Rwandan armed forces officers, M23 supporters and
politicians, at the beginning of July 2012, Gen. Kabarebe imposed Jean-Marie
Runiga Lugerero, a bishop, as the political coordinator of M23 (see annex 20 to the
present report). Mr. Runiga, the former CNDP party representative in Kinshasa,
travelled to Kigali before taking up his new post with the rebels. The same sources
stated that Gen. Kabarebe had also unilaterally appointed the members of the M23
government named on 17 August 2012 (see annex 21 to the present report). During a
visit by the Group to Bunagana on the day of the declaration, several M23 members
were unaware that they had been nominated to a cabinet position.
29. According to M23 members, collaborators and politicians, while regional
initiatives by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to resolve the
conflict began in August 2012, Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza advised the rebels on
how to update former CNDP demands to the current political context.

4
(e) M23 fundraising in Rwanda
30. RPF members have been recruiting sympathizers and raising funds for M23
from within Rwanda. Politicians, former Rwandan armed forces and CNDP officers
told the Group that Rwigamba Balinda, a Rwandan senator and Rector of the Free
University of Kigali, and John Rucyahana, a bishop (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 29),
both RPF members, had overseen those activities in Rwanda and abroad. The same
sources informed the Group that senior Rwandan armed forces officers and RPF
officials diverted a portion of the financial contributions collected on behalf of M23
for their own benefit.
(f) M23 chain of command in Kigali
31. Former M23 officers and soldiers stated that Gen. Ntaganda continued to serve
as the highest commander of the rebels on the ground, while Col. Makenga was
responsible for operations and coordination with allied armed groups. Rwandan
armed forces officers and current and former M23 members also stated that the
former CNDP leader, Gen. Laurent Nkunda,

5 a sanctioned individual, provided
advice to M23 commanders and recruited for M23 in Rwanda.
__________________
4

Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza instructed M23 to return to the demands that it made during the
peace process with the Government in 2008 and to add further elements that related to
governance and development.
5

Laurent Nkunda was designated for sanctions in 2007 while he was the leader of CNDP. See
S/2012/348/Add.1, paras. 27, 31 and 34.
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32. Rwandan officials exercise overall command and strategic planning for M23.
Politicians, current and former M23 members, Congolese armed forces officers and
former Rwandan armed forces officers all confirmed that Gen. Ntaganda and
Col. Makenga received direct military orders from the Chief of Staff of the
Rwandan armed forces, Gen. Kayonga, who in turn acted on instructions from the
Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. Kabarebe (see annex 22 to the present report).
The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Gen. Jacques Nziza, provides
strategic advice and oversees the provision of logistical support to M23.
Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza have also played an instrumental role in sustaining
the political activities of M23. According to former Rwandan armed forces officers,
current M23 members and former M23 officers, Gen. Ruvusha manages the
provision of military ground support to M23.
33. Several current and former M23 officers also stated that senior Rwandan
officials travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold meetings with
M23 commanders. Gen. Kayonga has been at least three times to Runyoni to plan
operations and reassure the rebels of the full support of the Government of Rwanda.
(g) Support for sanctioned individuals
34. Gen. Ntaganda continues to be based near Runyoni (see annex 23 to the
present report), just a few kilometres away from the Rwandan border, and regularly
travels to Rwanda, violating the travel ban. M23 officers loyal to Gen. Nkunda
stated that they agreed to operate with Rwandan support only after reassurances
from senior officials of the Government of Rwanda that the former CNDP leader
would be freed and allowed to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. M23
officers said that, in violation of his travel ban, Gen. Nkunda had visited M23 in
Runyoni to encourage his officers.
2. Support provided by the Government of Uganda to M23
35. While lower in intensity than the involvement of the Government of Rwanda,
networks within the Government of Uganda have also supported M23 by facilitating
the political and military activities of M23 members while permanently present in
Kampala and by providing technical assistance, political advice and military
support. Ugandan armed forces commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce
specific M23 operations and assisted in M23 recruitment and weapons procurement
efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a laissez-faire policy, by
which local military and civil authorities were authorized to cooperate with M23
because of their personal ties to the Rwandan armed forces or the rebels. Senior
Ugandan armed forces commanders have also cooperated with Gen. Ntaganda and
allowed him to visit and acquire a residence in Kampala, in violation of the travel
ban and assets freeze. In an official communication with the Committee, lawyers
hired by the Government of Rwanda have also cited support for M23 from Ugandan
territory (see annex 24 to the present report).
(a) Military support provided by the Ugandan armed forces to M23
(i) Troop support
36. Members of the Ugandan armed forces have actively supported M23 in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, alongside their Rwandan counterparts. During
its field missions to Rutshuru, the Group confirmed this with three Ugandan
S/2012/843
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intelligence officers, three Kampala-based diplomats and Ugandan and Congolese
authorities and community leaders.
37. Three officials of the Government of Uganda, a Ugandan local leader and M23
cadres told the Group that, in July, the Ugandan armed forces had assembled troops
from the Western Division headquarters in Mbarara and from Kisoro and sent them
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo using deployments near the border. To
facilitate Ugandan troop support, M23 placed agents at the Bunagana and Kitagoma
border posts. During its visit to Kitagoma in August 2012, the Group observed M23
controls on the Congolese side and no officials present on the Ugandan side (see
annex 25 to the present report).

6
38. Local Congolese armed forces commanders and current and former M23
officers informed the Group that, in July 2012, the Ugandan armed forces had
deployed a unit of some 600 soldiers of the Ugandan armed forces were present in
Busanza, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to prepare the rebel attacks in
Rutshuru territory. These same sources stated that the Ugandan soldiers had
reinforced Rwandan troops already present and formed what they termed a “mixed
brigade”, which outnumbered the M23 troops. During that period, a former M23
soldier overheard a conversation between Ugandan armed forces and M23
commanders, using a commercial radio, during which they discussed the need to
“decentralize the Kivus”. The Group obtained a copy of radio intercepts in which
Ugandan officers communicated with Rwandan and M23 officers during joint
military operations, speaking with a Swahili accent described by several interpreters
as being commonly used within the Ugandan military in addition to using some
expressions in Kiganda (see annex 26 to the present report).

7
39. Former M23 soldiers, local authorities and villagers were able to easily
distinguish the Ugandan troops because they wore Ugandan armed forces uniforms
and had distinct boots and military equipment. While the Ugandan troops spoke in
English, Kiganda, Kinyankole or Swahili, Rwandan troops spoke in Kinyarwanda
and M23 troops in a mix of Kinyarwanda and Swahili.
40. M23 cadres said that Ugandan armed forces officers introduced themselves as
Ugandans. A local leader told the Group that a Ugandan armed forces officer had
addressed the population in Kifumbira, a language spoken in south-western
Uganda.

8 Medical personnel stated that another Ugandan armed forces officer
unable to speak the local languages requested medicines from Rutshuru hospital in
English.
41. The Group interviewed a Ugandan soldier arrested in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. He said that, after completing military training in Masaka, Uganda,
his commanders had sent him to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
alongside three groups of 75 experienced Ugandan soldiers and other trainees. Two
former M23 soldiers who fought together with the Ugandan armed forces stated that
some of those soldiers were experienced, while the others had recently completed
basic training. The Group twice interviewed another Ugandan national captured by
__________________
6

The Government of Uganda informed the Group in writing that M23 had a military position at
Kitagoma.
7

The Group has placed these tapes in the United Nations archives.
8

Kifumbira is a language that is very similar to Kinyarwanda and is spoken in Rwanda and the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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15
the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru territory, who refused to reveal more than
his name and Ugandan armed forces membership.

9
42. Following the large-scale operations in July 2012, a border official, two
Congolese local leaders residing in Uganda and former M23 soldiers told the Group
that the Ugandan armed forces and M23 had evacuated casualties to Uganda and
transported them to the military hospital in Mbarara. The Group interviewed a
former M23 officer and a civilian who had been tasked with evacuating the dead and
injured across the border with a Ugandan armed forces escort.
(ii) Arms supplies
43. M23 has procured weapons and ammunition from Ugandan armed forces
commanders. Col. Makenga had already begun purchasing weapons from support
networks in Uganda before his desertion from the Congolese armed forces (see
annex 27 to the present report). The Group gathered many accounts of weapons
deliveries to M23 from within Uganda, in particular ahead of attacks in Rutshuru,
including the following:
(a) Former M23 soldiers stated that Ugandan armed forces officers based in
Kisoro had been supplying M23 with small quantities of weapons. One said that he
had accompanied Col. Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of
July 2012 and witnessed how Col. Makenga had procured weapons from Ugandan
armed forces officers. On each occasion they had returned with 12.7 mm machine
guns that they had received free of charge;
(b) A former M23 soldier stated that Ugandan armed forces commanders had
brought heavy weapons, including 12.7 mm machine guns, to the hill overlooking
Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the
attack and subsequently left them with the rebels after they had taken the town.

10 A
former M23 officer told the Group that during the attack he had received several
boxes of AK-47 and submachine gun ammunition from Ugandan soldiers stationed
on the same hill;
(c) Two former Rwandan armed forces officers, two Congolese armed forces
officers, an M23 cadre and a former M23 soldier stated that two trucks had
transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana before the attacks on Rutshuru
and Kiwanja. According to a Congolese armed forces officer, the two trucks mainly
contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machine guns;
(d) Two M23 cadres and a Kampala-based businessman told the Group that
Ugandan armed forces officers had met M23 representatives near the site of the
arms production plant at the Nakasongola military base

11 to discuss weapons stored
there. Ugandan armed forces officers had subsequently delivered the weapons and
ammunition, including mortars, to M23 in Bunagana, around 19 September 2012.
An M23 cadre, a Ugandan border official and an ex-Rwandan armed forces officer
stated that a truck had offloaded weapons in Bunagana during that same week.
__________________
9

The Ugandan national has also refused to state anything to the Congolese officers overseeing his
detention for more than two months.
10

These heavy weapons remained on the Ugandan side of the border until the rebels had dislodged
MONUSCO and the Congolese armed forces from Bunaganga, at which point Ugandan soldiers
provided them to M23.
11

The plant is operated by Luwero Industries.
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Attacks on principal towns in Rutshuru territory
M23, Rwandan and Ugandan troops operated together during the
July 2012 takeover of Rutshuru. Former Rwandan armed forces officers,
border officials, Congolese armed forces officers and former M23
soldiers stated that, during the night of 5 and 6 July 2012, while M23 and
Rwandan troops were engaged in combat in Bunagana, Ugandan troops
had shelled the border town from their deployment on the hill
overlooking the town and sent a unit of between 100 and 150 soldiers to
fight alongside M23 and Rwandan troops. MONUSCO peacekeepers
confirmed that the Congolese armed forces had been fired upon from
Uganda.
The Group interviewed separately 15 eyewitnesses to the events,
including Congolese and Ugandan border agents, Congolese armed
forces officers based at the border, villagers, refugees, a former Ugandan
armed forces soldier and M23 soldiers, who all observed Ugandan troops
crossing into Bunagana in the middle of the attack by the Rwandan
armed forces and M23.
Additional Ugandan troops crossed into the Democratic Republic
of the Congo through three distinct locations during the two days prior to
the 24 and 25 July 2012 operations against Rutshuru and Kiwanja. Four
local leaders, two Ugandan officials, Congolese refugees in Uganda and
former M23 soldiers witnessed four trucks crossing into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo through Kitagoma to Busanza. Four other trucks
entered through Bunagana and transported Ugandan troops and weapons
to the front lines in Rutshuru town and Kalengera. Congolese armed
forces and M23 soldiers estimate that these trucks transported some 300
additional Ugandan troops.
First-hand witnesses from Busanza told the Group that the
Ugandan, Rwandan and M23 troops had forced some 30 young men to
transport ammunition to Rutshuru and Kiwanja and then to evacuate
the
dead and injured on the way back to Kabira. The Group interviewed two
civilians among the 30. Congolese armed forces officers, former M23
officers and local leaders saw the bodies of Ugandan soldiers after the
battle.
Subsequent to the attack, the Congolese armed forces recovered
several ammunition cartridges normally used by their Ugandan
counterparts (see annex 28 to the present report).
(b) Recruitment for M23 in Uganda
44. M23 cadres have been recruiting in Uganda with the support of the Ugandan
authorities. Ugandan officials, a Ugandan border agent, a Ugandan community
leader, current M23 members and collaborators, former M23 soldiers, former
Rwandan armed forces officers, former CNDP officers, armed group members based
in Kampala and a diplomatic source told the Group that those activities were


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17
continuing in Mbarara, Kasese, Kampala and Kisoro, as well as in the refugee
camps of Kisoro and Nyakivale.
45. Four Ugandan officials, a Congolese armed forces officer based in Bunagana,
border agents and a former CNDP member told the Group that the Jomba locality
chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambu

 
 
 

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