Breaking the links between banks, corruption and poverty
CONTENTS
Summary ........... 03
1) Introduction:............ 07
2) Breaking the links between banks,
corruption and poverty.... .......... 17
Who is your customer?
3) Riggs and Equatorial Guinea:..........
26
Doing business with heads of state
(Plus: Where did Equatorial Guinea’s
oil
money go after the demise of Riggs?)
4) Barclays and Equatorial
Guinea:.................. 40
Doing business with the sons of
heads of state, Part I
(Plus: Who banks for President Bongo
of Gabon
since Citibank closed its doors to
him?)
5) Bank of East Asia and Republic of
Congo: ..........50
Doing business with the sons of
heads of state, Part II
6) Citibank, Fortis and Liberia’s
logs of war
Doing business with natural
resources that are fuelling conflict: ...............68
7) Deutsche Bank and Turkmenistan: ..........82
Doing business with a human rights
abuser
8) Oil-backed loans to Angola: .............90
Doing business with an opaque
national oil company
9) The problem with the Financial
Action Task Force.....105
10) Conclusions and recommendations......112
Glossary......124
A GLOBAL WITNESS: Undue-diligence How banks do business with corrupt regimes A report by Global Witness, March 2009
Summary
What is the problem? The world
has learnt during 2008 and 2009 that failures by banks and the governments that
regulate them have been responsible for pitching the global economy into its worst
crisis in decades. People in the world’s richest countries are rightly angry at
the increasing job losses and house repossessions.
What is less understood is that for
much longer, failures by banks and the governments that regulate them have
caused untold damage to the economies of some of the poorest countries in the
world.
By doing business with dubious
customers in corrupt, natural resource-rich states, banks are facilitating
corruption and state looting, which
deny these countries the chance to lift themselves out of poverty and leave
them dependent on aid.
This is happening despite a raft of
anti-money laundering laws that require them to do due diligence to identify
their customer and turn down illicitly-acquired funds. But the current laws are
ambiguous about how far banks must go to identify the real person behind a series
of front companies and trusts. They fail to be explicit about how banks should
handle natural resource revenues when they may befuelling
corruption. And if a bank has filed a report on a suspicious customer as
required by the law, but then the authorities permit the transaction to go
ahead, the bank can legally take dirty money. So it may be............
SUMMARY
possible for a bank to fulfil the
letter of its legal obligations, yet still do business with these dubious
customers. By accepting these customers,
banks are – directly or indirectly – assisting those who are using the assets
of the state to enrich themselves or brutalise their own people. Corruption is
not just done by the dictator who has control of natural resource revenues. He
needs a bank willing to take the money. It takes two to tango.
This report presents a series of
case studies about bank customers in Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Liberia, Angola and Turkmenistan. In these countries, the national resource
wealth has or had been captured by an unaccountable few, whether for personal enrichment,
to maintain an autocratic personality cult that violated human rights, or to
fund devastating wars. The banks doing business with these customers include
Barclays, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC. Nearly all of the banks that feature
in this report are major international banks and all of them make broad claims
about their commitments to social responsibility. Yet there is a grotesque
mismatch between rhetoric and reality. Their customers are heads of state or
their family members, state-owned companies used as off-budget financing mechanisms
by their parent government, central banks in states that have been captured by
one individual, and companies trading natural resources out of conflict zones.
Banks should have been extremely wary about doing business with any of them.
Why
does it matter?
Natural resource revenues offer a
potential way out of poverty for many developing countries.
But too often, resource revenues
that could be spent on development are misappropriated or looted by senior
government officials, or are used to prop up regimes that oppress their own
people. Banks have a crucial role to play as the first line of defense against
corrupt funds, but they are not doing a good job of it. The key step banks are
already required to perform to prevent corrupt funds entering
the international system is due
diligence, to find out who their customer is and where his or her funds have
come from. But the current system is full of loopholes, whether in the anti-money
laundering laws themselves, or the way that they are enforced. The result is
that the international banking system is complicit in helping to perpetuate
poverty, corruption, conflict, human suffering and misery.
This is a serious matter of public
interest, both in the countries whose natural resources ought to be paying for
development but are not, and in the countries whose taxpayers are funding aid
to the developing world to fill the gap that is left by corruption and other forms
of illicit capital flight. Global Witness is publishing this report in order to
provide a tool for productive debate and, hopefully, to contribute to an
improvement in banking regulation and enforcement that will have a
positive impact on development
outcomes for the world’s poorest countries. In the current climate of banking
meltdown, the report’s focus on transparency and the need for assurance that
the financial regulatory system is working effectively is of particular public
interest.
What can be done?
The changes in financial regulation
that are on the way as a result of the global financial crisis also present a
chance to tackle the financial industry’s ongoing facilitation of corruption. While the multiple causes of a complex banking
crisis are different to the relatively straightforward factors which allow
banks to do business with corrupt regimes, there are two identical underlying
themes. The first is that when it comes to sticking to the rules, bankers are
doing the minimum they can get away with. They aggressively exploit the loopholes
and ambiguities in regulations and arbitrage their responsibilities to the lowest
level. The second is that regulation by individual national governments is too fragmented
to be effective, is hindered by bank secrecy laws, and is not backed by political
will.
Global Witness is making the
following recommendations, which need to be adopted globally, with effective
information sharing across borders. There would be no point in tightening
anti-money laundering rules only in Europe and the US if that meant that dirty money
then flowed, for example, towards Asia.
1. Banks must change their culture
of know-your-customer due diligence, and not treat it solely as a box-ticking exercise
of finding the minimum information necessary to comply with the law. Banks
should adopt policies so that if they cannot identify the ultimate beneficial
owner of the funds, or the settlor and beneficiary if the customer is a trust,
and if they cannot identify a natural person (not a legal entity) who does not
pose a corruption risk, they must not accept the customer as a client. They
should adopt this standard even if
they are not legally required by their jurisdiction to do so.
2. Banks must be properly regulated
to force them to do their know your customer due diligence properly, so that if
they cannot identify the ultimate beneficial owner of the funds, or the settlor
and
beneficiary if the customer is a
trust, and if they cannot identify a natural person (not a legal entity) who
does not pose a corruption risk, they must not accept the customer as a client.
Anti-money laundering laws must be
absolutely explicit, and consistent across different jurisdictions, that banks
must identify the natural person behind the funds, investigate the source of
funds, and refuse the customer if they present a corruption risk.
Regulators are in the front line of
ensuring that this is enforced, and should treat the prevention of corrupt
money flows as a priority. This is the scandal at the heart of the system, because
customer identification has been the crucial element of money laundering laws
since their inception in the 1980s. Yet inconsistencies and a failure by many
jurisdictions to be sufficiently explicit about what is required from banks in
practice mean that there are still too many loopholes that can be exploited.
While it is important that banks
develop their own effective know-your-customer policies, as per the previous
recommendation, leaving banks to do it on their own without regulatory oversight
will not work, because the avoidance of corrupt funds inevitably involves
turning down potential business, and not all banks are willing to do this. The
subprime crisis and ensuing credit crunch have shown, among other things, that
allowing banks to self-regulate does not work. They consistently claim that they
employ the cleverest people in the world and can be allowed to manage their own
risk. But if, as they have shown, they cannot safely manage the task that is of
greatest importance to them – making a profit – then it seems clear that they
cannot be expected to self-regulate when it comes to ethical issues.
3. International cooperation has got
to improve. A necessary first step is to
overhaul and strengthen the workings of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),
a little known and opaque inter-governmental body that sets the global standard
for the anti-money laundering rules that are supposed to prevent flows of
corrupt funds. FATF must use its powers to name and shame more effectively,
open itself up to external scrutiny, and cooperate with other organizations and
government agencies working on corruption.
FATF’s members – which include the states that are
home to the world’s major economies – also need to get their own houses in
order before they lecture the small island tax havens who have frequently been
FATF’s targets.
For example, of 24 FATF member states evaluated in
the last three years, none were fully compliant with Recommendation 5, which
requires countries to have laws in place obliging banks to identify their
customer and none had legislation in compliance with FATF’s Recommendation 6
which says countries must require their banks to perform enhanced due diligence
on politically-exposed persons (PEPS: senior government officials or their relatives
and associates, who because of their access to state resources are a heightened
money laundering risk). Only four countries were ‘largely compliant,’ two were
‘partially compliant,’ eighteen, including the UK, were non-compliant.
1 (See table on page 107)
4. New rules are needed to help banks avoid corrupt
funds. Each country should publish an online
• registry of the beneficial ownership of all
companies and trusts, and an income and asset declaration database for its government
officials. National regulators should be required
• by FATF to assess the effectiveness of the commercial
databases of PEPs on which banks rely to carry out their customer due
diligence.
• Banks should not be permitted to perform transactions
involving natural resource revenues unless they have adequate information to
ensure that the funds are not being diverted from government purposes; should
be required to publish details of loans they make to sovereign governments or
state owned companies, as well as central bank accounts that they hold for
other countries; and should develop procedures to recognize and avoid the
proceeds of natural resources that are fuelling conflict, regardless of whether
official sanctions have yet been applied.
(See page 116 for a full explanation of these and
other recommendations.)
The governments of the world’s major economies must
stand up to make these things happen. If they do not, no other jurisdictions
will either. Governments that have bailed out banks and whose taxpayers
now own a stake in them have even more incentive to
do so. Those governments that have committed themselves to making poverty history,
and that claim to be pushing good governance and accountability through their aid
interventions, are guilty of hypocrisy if they fail to take responsibility for
how their financial institutions and the financial system which they regulate
are contributing to corruption and therefore poverty.
READ MORE...........
https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/undue_diligence_lowres_0.pdf
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